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ABSTRACT 
This research will examine the use of a computer-based experimental program 
utilizing a Menu Method and Bid Method Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
(CRAM) to address the impact of monetary and non-monetary incentives for Navy Nurse 
Corps (NC) Officers. A labor market experiment will conducted under laboratory 
conditions to represent the natural market. Additionally, the research will investigate the 
individual and cohort behavior of participants in the decision-making process when 
examining monetary and non-monetary incentive options. Previous research has shown 
CRAM to be the most desirable and effective auction mechanism for creating a balance 
between value to the member and overall cost to the Navy. The computer-based 
experiments revealed optimal decision-making behaviors utilizing Menu Method and Bid 
Method CRAM. The results of the experiment will further assess the usage of CRAM 
methods for increasing retention among Navy Nurse Corps Officers, while minimizing 
the cost to provide the incentives and maximizing personal utility. This thesis is compose 
of three major components: (1) a review of the current status of the Navy Nurse Corps 
community, (2) a review of previous studies and reports related to Navy Nurse Corps 
retention, experimental economics, and auction mechanisms, (3) analysis of data obtained 
from the labor market experiments based on combinatorial auction mechanisms. The 
conclusions drawn for the analysis revealed that subjects in the experiment consistently 
bid their true and optimal value where value > cost, thereby maximizing their value and 
producing substantial cost savings. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A.  BACKGROUND  
1. The Nursing Shortage in America 
The current political climate in the United States has heated to a boiling point 
over healthcare reform, specifically targeting the insurance industry. However, another 
crisis in healthcare looms on the social and political horizon. It is one of the most 
monumental challenges facing the United States healthcare industry, the shortage of 
professional registered nurses. The nursing shortage has become a crippling agent for 
many already struggling hospitals nationwide. Hundreds of healthcare professionals and 
medical experts hypothesize about the cause of the shortage. It seems to be the product of 
a multitude of dynamic variables affecting the availability of professional nurses 
throughout the industry. Some clearly, identifiable factors include the exodus of 
experienced nurses, the absence of nurse educators, the bottleneck in the admission of 
new students, and the supply and demand constraints of the civilian nursing market.  
Moreover, the nursing shortages are having a direct effect on access to care, cost, 
and quality of care in healthcare organizations throughout the country. A study by the 
National Center for Health Workforce Analysis, states that the nursing workforce 
shortage is growing and will critical proportions beginning in 2010, and continue to 
worsen at least through 2020. Additionally, the report suggests that this will be the worst 
nursing shortage in American history by 2010 (Bellack, 2007). Nurses are the backbone 
of the healthcare industry. They represent one of the largest suppliers of labor in the 
industry. A hospital cannot operate without a stable supply of competent, highly skilled, 
and dedicated nurses. The fallout of the shortages does not simply affect the medical 
community of major cities and big states. It is a national crisis. Only five states in the 
country, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, and New Hampshire are actually projecting  
 
 
enough supply to meet their demand for nurses. All the other forty-five states are 




Table 1.   Projection of Registered Nurses from 2000–2020 (From: Nursing Supply 
Model by the National Center for Health Workforce Analysis) 
The nursing shortage could not have come at a worse time due to the identical 
phenomenon occurring in other medical professions, such as doctors, dentist, and 
administrators. In addition, the American population is aging as a whole and experiencing 
an increase in life expectancy. They are presenting to healthcare facilities with more 
complex diseases and co-morbidities, which require extensive and sometime 
sophisticated medical care. There appears to a quiet storm lurking on the horizon for the 
American public. Katherine Mangan from the Chronicle of Higher Education, referred to 
a report, based on numbers from The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services in 
2004. She states, “The U.S. could face a shortage of nearly one million nurses by 2020, 
which may be more than the industry could bear. The shortages would come at a time 
when the aging population will need more care” (Mangan, 2007). 
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Consequently, “age” will be a major contributing factor to shortages in the 
healthcare industry itself, as well as the general population. The professional nursing 
population is getting older on average. Their ability to perform labor-intensive tasks will 
decline, as well as their ability to work long hours. Both of these elements are of 
importance to the profession because they are common requirements when performing 
basic nursing duties. The average age of the RN population was over 46 years old, in 
2004 (Service, 2007). Secondly, the baby boomer generation makes up a large proportion 
of the present nurse workforce. In the next 5–7 years, retirements among this generation 
is expected to excel rapidly. These older, more experienced nurses seem to be retiring 
earlier to pursue other dreams as they enjoy an increased life expectancy. The ranks of 
the nursing profession will shrink considerable if this occurs. The current national 
economic crisis has somewhat slowed the pace of nursing retirements. However, as the 
markets change, financial fears subside, and the overall economy improves, those nurses 
posed to retire will resume their plans. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Factors Affecting the Nursing Population (From: Nursing Supply Model 
by the National Center for Health Workforce Analysis) 
One of the solutions to the shortage problem also seems to pose a serious 
challenge in itself. A simple solution would be to increase the number of new nurses. In 
the long run, enrolling college students in professional nursing programs across the 
country should alleviate the shortage. Therefore, many private and public organizations 
invested large amounts of capital in marketing campaigns aimed at achieving this 
objective. However, they soon discovered that nursing programs around the country were 
simply not producing enough new qualified registered nurses to meet the demand.  
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In addition to a shortage of staff nurses in hospitals and clinics, there is an even 
greater demand for nurse educators. Nationally, nursing schools are turning away 
thousands of qualified applicants due to a shortage in capacity and nurse educators. In a 
statement from the American Association of Colleges of Nursing (AACN) in 2006, 
37,514 students were turned away or denied admission from Nursing Baccalaureate 
programs in 2005, as opposed to 3,600 in 2002 (Service, 2007). Nurse educators at the 
university level typically have graduate degrees in a nursing specific area of study. 
Therefore, there is a lag in the time required to produce new educators, train them for 
specific areas of nurse education, and place them in classrooms. 
Along with nursing schools turning away qualified applicants, some potential 
candidates with a desire to be a nurse do not apply. Most Baccalaureate nursing programs 
are heavily focused in science and critical thinking skills, along with the traditional 
aspects nursing care. Therefore, a large number of prospective candidates prefer to pursue 
a program, such as Licensed Practical Nursing (LPN). It is less intensive, shorter in 
length, and lacks the major scientific requirements of a four-year program (Service, 
2007). The shortage of nursing faculty at the university level will prove to be even more 
severe than the crisis facing staff nurses in hospitals. Nursing programs around the 
country will be limited in expansion capabilities, effectiveness of academic and clinical 
programs, and academic research and development. 
2. The Nursing Shortage in the United States Navy 
The medical professionals that make up Navy Medicine are in high demand 
throughout the nation. Their skills and professional credentials make them a sought after 
commodity for civilian employment. Nursing professionals represent the largest portion 
of the professional medical community. In turn, the Navy must continually compete for 
these highly competent and well-trained professionals. For the past decade, competition 
has dramatically increased, with the civilian market offering new nurses a number of 




battle for new nurses. However, recent economical phenomena have creative a slight 
paradigm shift toward more secure industries such government agencies, including the 
Department of Defense. 
B.  PURPOSE 
1. Issues of Retention in the Navy Nurse Corps 
It is important to define retention in the military medical community as it relates 
to officers. A definition extracted from the Government Accountability Office describes 
retention in the military as the military services retaining service-members with the 
necessary skills and experience (GAO, 2009). The status of retention in the Navy Nurse 
Corps (NNC) at this time is considered “high,” according to manpower experts within the 
community. However, this pseudo improvement in nursing retention is a temporary 
function of the economic downturn. The current economic recession that is rippling 
throughout the United States has forced many Nurse Corps officers to reconsider 
retirement plans. However, it must be noted that as the financial markets improve, 
economic fears slowly subside, and the overall economy recovers, many of those nurses 
will retire. 
2. Reasons for Attrition, Separation, and Retirement 
At this moment, however, the crisis has left a large number of senior nurses in 
place, and junior nurses with little room to grow professionally. Traditionally, new nurses 
were given numerous avenues of professional pursuit after completing their first 1–2 
years in clinical areas, such as medical/surgical wards, intensive care units, and other 
patient care specialties. However, they currently find themselves assigned to basic 
nursing duties in clinical areas for longer periods of time. In turn, many junior NC 
officers feel ignored, neglected, or generally dissatisfied with the direction their careers 
are going. They see little potential for future growth and become disenchanted with their 
Navy nursing careers. A large number of Junior NC Officers separate from active duty 
service after only one, initial tour.  
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Another group affected by a lack of motivation to remain on active duty are the 
prior-enlisted NC Officers. Many new NC officers began their Navy careers as enlisted 
service members. They aspired, planned, and worked their way up through military 
ranking structure and earned a commissioning in Navy Nurse Corps. Their leadership 
skills and professionalism are honed at the deck plates and carried into the Nurse Corps 
through one of several commissioning sources. Many of these NC officers find 
themselves facing the option of retirement after the required ten years of obligated 
service is complete. After giving much of their adult lives to Navy, and at least ten years 
to the Nurse Corps, they discover a void in their motivation to stay. Additionally and 
surprisingly, they find little to no incentive programs offered to them for continued 
service in the Navy Nurse Corps. 
The Junior Nurse Corps Officers that separate after their first tour, and the prior 
enlisted officer that retire make up the majority of the pool of mid-level officers that 
would have been senior officer in four to six years. Therefore, a large shortage is 
forecasted for senior NC Officers in the next five to 10 years. Annually, the NNC set its 
target accession and retention goals. The average retention goal for mid-grade 
Lieutenants (O-3) is about 65 percent. Therefore, the NNC wants to retain 65percent of 
these officers, so they will be available for the LCDR (O-4) boards. In 2009, the NC 
promoted 90 percent of LTs to LCDRs, which is a very high percentage based on past 
board statistics. Possibly, a direct result of the shortage of LT’s (O-3), many of which are 
those junior nurses that separated after their first tour or disenchanted prior-enlisted 
officer that retired.  
The NNC was forced to promote the ones they had in inventory in 2009. It is a 
trend that is most likely going to be seen again in the next 2–4 years. In turn, this means 
that promotions should be getting better for most junior NC officers, yet it may also 
dilute the quality of senior officers. Incentive programs that target retention will be at the 
center of any strategy to confront the issue of manpower shortages in the Navy Nurse 
Corps community. A mechanism or program, such as CRAM, that’s designed to 
effectively increase retention and save cost will be valuable to any Navy community, 
especially one as unique as the Nurse Corps. 
 Table 2.   Navy Nurse Corps Direct Accession Goals FY2001–2008 (From: GAO 
Analysis of Service Data) 
3. Attempts to Address Retention in Nurse Corps 
The NNC have attempted to address retention in number of ways over the years. 
CDR Lawrence Bateman, the Manpower Systems Analyst community Specialty Leader 
stated that, “retaining junior NC Officers with 3–6 years of service, at the level of junior 
and mid-grade lieutenants (LT) has been a problem for the past 10 years. There is a major 
gap in the number of mid-grade LT, and this affects promotion and training. Mid-Grade 
LTs are the mentors and trainers for new NNC Ensigns (ENS) at most Navy medical 
treatment facilities (MTF). Their absence leaves the NC with many incidences of 
“Ensigns training Ensigns” (L. Bateman, personal communication, 2010). 
Retaining NNC Officers with prior-enlisted experience beyond their eligibility to 
retire period is another concern for the community. At this time, officers with prior 
enlisted experience are eligible to retire after 10 years of service. Many of them choose to 
retire, rather than extend their time on active duty. They cite a number of reasons for 
retiring, and many of them are non-monetary in nature. Additionally, there are not many 
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incentives, monetary or non-monetary, aimed at retaining this group of invaluable 
officers. For example, CDR Bateman discussed, a friend’s retirement from the Navy as 
soon as he was eligible because he could not get the orders he wanted. “He wanted to stay 
in the Portsmouth, VA area but the community detailer wanted to move him because he 
hadn’t been to a certain level command i.e., “A Big Three,” so he decided to get out. The 
idea of moving his family again was too much” (L. Bateman, personal communication, 
2010). The “Big Three” refers to the Navy three largest medical treatment facilities, 
Naval Medical Center Portsmouth in Virginia, Naval Medical Center San Diego in 
California, and National Naval Medical Center Bethesda in Maryland.  
According to CDR Bateman, the NNC has some promising retention tools that 
have shown to be affective. However, they have not dramatically decrease the separation 
or retirement rate (L. Bateman, personal communication, 2010). The Health Professions 
Loan Repayment Program attempts to address the financial concerns of new officers that 
come into the Navy education related debt. The Incentive Specialty Pay has help 
increased the number of NNC officers retained with knowledge, skills, and abilities 
identified as mission critical, yet does not address the most desired groups, junior officer 
without a specialty or prior-enlisted officers eligible for retirement. These programs will 
be discussed in more detailed, later in Chapter II. 
Some of the issues with structuring and implementing new incentive programs for 
NC officers are the cost of these programs, leadership support, and measurements of 
effectiveness. Costing out incentive programs, especially certain non-monetary benefits, 
such as sabbaticals, telecommuting, and childcare is difficult. In most cases, the 
administrative cost and other intangible cost could prove almost impossible to identify 
(L. Bateman, personal communication, 2010). Setting up a system that effectively 
assesses, supports, and measure the success of these incentive programs may also require 
resources, which are already limited. 
Moreover, the perception of the NNC leadership could also create some 
challenges. If leadership does not feel a crisis is looming it becomes quite difficult to 
obtain support and more importantly, allocation of proper resources. Retention is 
relatively high overall due to the current recession and civilian unemployment numbers 
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(L. Bateman, personal communication, 2010). Therefore, the perception could be that 
retention is not a pressing issue. Additionally, retaining quality nurses is not deemed to be 
concerning. According to CDR Bateman, there are mechanisms in place to “weed out the 
poor performers or behavioral issues” (L. Bateman, personal communication, 2010). He 
states, “PRT failures, drug related incidences and NJP’s, FITREPS, incompetence noted 
in personnel records, etc, generally takes care of the low quality nurses. It’s really pure 
numbers” (L. Bateman, personal communication, 2010). He believes that quantity or 
increase number of available nurses is at the heart of the issue. 
In a Senate Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee, Rear Admiral 
(lower half) Christine M. Bruzek-Kohler, the Director of the Navy Nurse Corps, reported 
a healthy force of Navy Nurse Corps officers. Although, there is a national shortage of 
nurses in the country, all three services reported successful attainment of their 
recruitment and retention goals. Rear Admiral Bruzek-Kohler, spoke of new incentive 
and training programs that “will help boost those numbers even further” (Bruzek-Kohler, 
2009). She explained further, “the active-duty Navy nurse corps is staffed at 96 percent 
and made its accession goal for the third year in a row and the Reserve component met 
107 percent of its recruiting goal in 2008. However, deficits from the three previous years 
have led to challenges filling junior officer billets” (Bruzek-Kohler, 2009). 
C.  THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The research questions addressed in this thesis look to present alternative 
strategies for Navy Nurse Corps leaders and Manpower Systems Analyst to assess, 
implement, and measure, monetary and non-monetary retention incentives targeting 
specific groups. Furthermore, it examines the decision- making behaviors of individuals 
in an experimental environment, the effectiveness of Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanisms, and how it may utilized in the Navy Nurse Corps community. In this thesis, 
some basic assumptions are made before conclusions can are drawn. The first is that the 




second is that Navy Nurse Corps Officers value the same or similar Non-monetary 
Incentives (NMI) as the individual in the sample. Finally, that Navy Nurse Officers will 
behave the same or similar to the individuals in the sample. 
1. The Primary Question 
What is the independent and interdependent effect of monetary and non-monetary 
incentives on Nurse Corps Officers utilizing a uniform and discriminatory partial 
information auction mechanism? 
2. Secondary Questions 
The secondary research questions look to examine specific issues in the NNC 
community related to value for NNC officers, decision-making behavior of NNC officers, 
retention of specific groups within the NNC community, and possible cost-effectiveness 
of a program, such as CRAM.  
 Do Nurse Corps (NC) Officers value the same monetary and non-
monetary incentives as Surface Warfare Officers? 
 How do NC Officers behave when presented with a menu of monetary and 
non-monetary incentives? 
 Can a Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) program be 
utilized to improve retention among Junior Navy NC officers and NC 
officers with more than eight years of prior-enlisted experience? 
 What combination of monetary and/or non-monetary incentives would be 
both, valued by Nurse Corps Officers and cost-effective to Navy 
Medicine? 
 What are the cost savings associated with utilizing an auction mechanism, 
such as CRAM, for Navy Medicine? 
 Can utilizing an auction mechanism such Menu Method or Bid Method 
CRAM increase the number of senior minority officers in the Navy Nurse 
Corps. 
D.  SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, ASSUMPTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
The scope will include: (1) a review of the current status of the Navy Nurse Corps 
community, (2) a review of previous studies and reports related to Navy Nurse Corps 
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retention, experimental economics, and auction mechanisms, and (3) analysis of data 
obtained from the labor market experiments based on Combinatorial Auction 
Mechanisms. The thesis will conclude with a summary, conclusion, and 
recommendations for further study.  
The research is limited based on the mixed demographics of the pool 
experimental participants. Most of the labor market experiments were performed with a 
variety of individuals that attend or work at the Naval Postgraduate School. Furthermore, 
none of them was NNC officers. We make the broad assumption that Navy Nurse Corps 
officer will behave similarly under the same conditions. A Government Accountability 
Office survey and report is the primary resource used to determine what NNC officer’s 
value and how they may behave when making decision in a Menu Method or Bid Method 
CRAM experiment.  
This thesis is a part of the continuing research being conducted by Dr. William 
Gates, Dr. Peter Coughlan, and Dr. Noah Myung related to Combinatorial Retention 
Auction Mechanisms. The research methodology used in this thesis will consist of the 
following steps.  
 Conduct a literature search of books, naval officer retention studies, 
reports. Journal articles, and other literary information resources 
 Conduct a thorough review of Nurse Corps retention efforts and identify 
needs common to other officer communities 
 Conduct literature search on previous studies and reports related to auction 
mechanisms and experimental economics. 
 Conduct labor market experiments to obtain data on individual and cohort 
decision-making behavior related to selecting monetary and non-monetary 
incentives. 
 Analyze the research data from the experiment and identify trends. 
Identify potential usage of auction mechanisms for Nurse Corps officers 
based on experimental data. 
 Present findings. 
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E.  ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
A thorough literature review of the materials, ideas, concepts, and perspectives 
covered in this thesis is presented in Chapter II. It will examine the nursing shortage in 
civilian sector, as well as the United States Navy. Chapter II also give a brief clear picture 
of retention in the Navy Nurse Corps, the means by which leadership is addressing it, and 
a brief introduction to Auction Mechanisms, CRAM, and experimental economics. The 
theme of Chapter III is Retention Mechanisms. It defines, examines, and describes 
auction mechanisms, monetary and non-monetary incentives, and CRAM in more detail 
than previous chapters. Chapter IV briefly describes experimental economics and details 
the nature, conduct, and results of the labor market experiment used for this thesis. The 
final Chapter V presents draws conclusions about the experiments, summarizes the thesis, 
and make recommendations for further research.  
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II.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
A.  THE PROFESSIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE NURSING SHORTAGE 
The literature reveals a continual requirement for human capital in the global 
nursing community. The military medical force is ultimately representative and supplied 
by the civilian medical workforce. Simply stated, if there is a shortage of new registered 
nurses in the civilian sector then this has a direct negative effect on the ability for the 
Navy to recruit nurses. The Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) 
suggest that the current shortage of nurses in this country will continue to grow with 
severity over the next 20 years (HRSA, 2004).  
Therefore, the NNC must continually compete with the civilian healthcare 
industry to recruit qualified nurses and in turn, achieve its manpower objectives. 
Historically, registered nurses have been in high demand and diminish supply since the 
end of World War II. The supply and demand of registered nurses in the United States 
has only reach equilibrium twice since the 1940s (Turner, 1990). The HRSA reports, 
absent an aggressive intervention, the supply of nurses in America will fall 36 percent 
(more than 1 million nurses) below the requirement by the year 2020 (HRSA, 2004). 
Nursing programs across the country cannot produce enough nurses to meet the 
current demand. A brief from the Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service stated that a 
shortage of healthcare workers, including registered nurses are likely to continue 
(Service, 2007). The problem with recruitment and retention is based on a multitude of 
dynamic and complex issues that affect the current labor market. A study by the National 
Center for Health Workforce Analysis, states that the nursing workforce shortage is 
growing and will critical proportions beginning in 2010, and continue to worsen at least 
through 2020 (Bellack, 2007). Additionally, the report suggests that this will be the worst 
nursing shortage in American history by 2010 (Bellack, 2007).  
The generational differences are one of those key variables. There are marked 
differences in expectations, work ethics, compensation, company loyalty, lifestyle 
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choices, labor relations, and the balance between work and leisure time (Sudheimer, 
2009). The “Baby-Boomers, Generation X and Y, and the Millennials” all place 
distinctively different demands on employers based on their expectations. The “boomers’ 
make up the majority of the professional nursing labor force and their exercising their 
options to retire at an increasing rate. Generation X, Y, and the Millennials will be groups 
that employers must now target and their needs are completely different and diverse 
(Sudheimer, 2009). Any organization requiring the skills of a registered nurse must 
address this generation gap.  
Another relevant issue affecting future recruitment and ultimately, retention of 
nursing staff across the healthcare industry is the professional nursing education system. 
Many professional nursing schools around the country are turning new applicants away 
due to faculty staffing shortages. A statement from the American Association of Colleges 
of Nursing (AACN) in 2006 stated, 37,514 students were turned away or denied 
admission from Nursing Baccalaureate programs in 2005, as opposed to 3,600 in 2002 
(Allen, 2008). The increase demand for nurses has not coincided with an increase in 
nurse educators. Allen, further explains the main reasons for the lack of faculty to meet 
the demand for more nurses include the increased age of the current faculty and the 
declining number of years left to teach, expected increases in faculty retirements, less 
compensation for academic teaching than positions in clinical areas for master’s and 
doctoral prepared nurses (Allen, 2008).  
B.  BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NAVY NURSE CORPS  
1. Historical Highlights of the Navy Nurse Corps 
In order to address the causes, effects, and any future inventions it is important to 
examine the history of Navy Nurse Corps, its organizational structure, and current 
climate. Although, nurses were not new to the United States Navy, the Navy Nurse Corps 
(NNC) was officially, established on May 13, 1908 by an act of Congress. The first group 
of individuals commissioned as Navy Nurses were twenty women, later known as the 
“Sacred Twenty.” Until this time, nurses served in a number of roles as civilian 
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volunteers during the Civil War. It was not until World War II, that the number of Navy 
Nurses would begin to swell to its peak strength of 1386 in 1918 (Whiteclay, 2000). 
However, the number of nurses decreased dramatically at the end of the war. Their 
number declined to between 400–500 active duty personnel. 
Navy nurses were there on the infamous day of December 7, 1941. They were on 
the ground at Pearl Harbor when the Japanese attacked, and begin immediately treating 
the injured and dying. Throughout the war, the NNC numbers would grow to an all time 
peak level of 11,086 nurses on active duty by 1945, serving at 40 naval hospitals, 176 
dispensaries, and six hospital corps schools in the United States (Whiteclay, 2000). A 
female corps of caregivers was stationed all over the world from Europe to Asia 
dispensing care to military’s sick and injured. In April 1947, the Army Navy Nurses Act 
established the Nurse Corps as a permanent staff corps of the U.S. Navy bringing 
permanent commissioned rank and equal pay, and then began to admit men into the 
Nurse Corps in November 1964. By the late 1990s, there were over 5,000 active duty and 
reserve nurses in the U.S. Navy and continuing to grow strong (Whiteclay, 2000). 
2. Status and Structure of Today’s Navy Nurse Corps  
Today, the Navy employs over 5,000, active duty and reserve Nurse Corps 
officers (Houde, 2010). They represent a diverse group of men and women dedicated to 
the service of saving lives. Currently, 2,694 nurses serve on Active Duty in a variety of 
specialties, subspecialties, and challenging work environments (Houde, 2010). They 
serve as mental health nurses, medical and surgical nurses, emergency and trauma nurses, 
critical care nurse, certified nurse anesthetist, nurse practioners, education and training 
nurses, manpower systems analyst, and a host of other administrative and operational 
assignments. Today’s Navy Nurse Corps officer is a highly skilled and competent, 
respected, diverse, well trained, highly educated, and well compensated professional. The 
following chart depicts the multiple nursing specialties within the NNC, which also 
require specific degrees of higher education. 
 Figure 2.   Subspecialty Codes (SSC) (From: NKO: United States Navy Nurse Corps, 
SSC, AQD’s and Record Management) 
The organization of the Navy Nurse Corps begins with the Director of the Navy 
Nurse Corps, a two-star Admiral that reports directly to the Surgeon General of the Navy. 
The Deputy Director, several Assistants, several regional executives, and a large number 
of Senior Executives support the Director in implementing the policies of the Bureau of 
Navy Medicine. These executives serve throughout the country and internationally at 
military medical treatment facilities (MTF), medical support commands, and other 
operational or administrative roles. The following organizational chart displays a 
graphical depiction of the NNC.  
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 Figure 3.   Navy Nurse Corps Leadership Organizational Chart 
3. Accession Programs 
In an effort to meet end strength, which is the number of active-duty military 
nurses in the Navy on the last day of the federal accounting period, the NNC tries to 
balance between the number of accessions, separations, and retained nurses. In FY2009, 
the NNC acquired 275 new nurses from its accession programs. The annual NC accession 
goals are to acquire between 250–260 new nurses. It equates to 250 new Ensigns (O-1), 
which if retained at 65 percent until Lieutenant (O-3) 5 years later, then the NC has 162 
Lieutenants available for the Lieutenant Commander (O-4) promotion board. The 
following table illustrates the acquisition goals for FY2010–2015 of nurses from 
accession programs offered by the NNC (L. Bateman, personal communication, 2010). 
 17
 Table 3.   Active Navy Nurse Corps Accession Goals for FY2010–2015 (From: Navy 
Nurse Corps Webpage. Navy Knowledge Online. L. Houde. NC Monthly 
Report January 2010, Excel Spreadsheet retrieved on March 10, 2010.) 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, currently military Manpower professional 
stated as “high.” However, these recent gains do not offset or defer the forecast of a 
pending crisis in the NNC ranks. The NC did not meet the goal of 250 new accessions 5 
years ago (2003–2005). Therefore, the available pool of Lieutenant Commanders for the 
2008–2010 promotion boards will not meet the 162 Lieutenants that are required. The 












NC ACCESSIONS FY04–09  
              
  FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 Actual 
Begin Strength: 3108 3036 2932 2828 2804 2793 
       
Gains       
DIRECT^ 41 46 54 49 61 72 
(DA) HPLRP   23 19 20 10 
RECALL 18 9 8 2 2 4 
NROTC 38 40 34 57 38 40 
NCP 61 38 48 61 56 69 
MECP 63 47 42 39 53 58 
STA 21 1 9 19 28 14 21 
HSCP 0 0 0 1 0  
FTOST 0 0 0 0 0  
FROM TNWO 0 0 0 0 0  
IST 0 1 2 0 2  
Other (PERS) 1 3 0 2 1 1 
Total Gains: 223 193 230 258 247 275 
Table 4.   Active Navy Nurse Corps Accessions for FY2004–2009 (From: Navy Nurse 
Corps Web page. Navy Knowledge Online. L. Houde. NC Monthly Report 
January 2010, Excel Spreadsheet retrieved on March 10, 2010) 
Several standard programs are used to acquire new nurses into the Navy Nurse 
Corps. These programs have been relatively unchanged over the past 10–15 years. The 
NNC relies heavily on accession programs to meet their annual end strength goals. The 
following is a list of the most common programs, a brief description, and their 
requirements. 
a.  Naval Reserve Officer Training Program (NROTC) 
The Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps offers a four or two year 
scholarship for nursing students to complete a Bachelor of Science in Nursing. It will pay 
for tuition, fees, and books while providing a $250.00 monthly stipend to recipients and 
obligate to serve at least 4 years on active duty (NROTC, 2010). The following is a brief 




 U.S. citizenship 
 Not less than 17 years old by September 1 of year starting college and no 
more than 23 on June 30 of that year 
 Must not have reached 27th birthday by June 30 of year in which 
graduation and commissioning are anticipated 
 Applicants with prior military service may be eligible for age adjustments 
for amount of time equal to their prior service, on month-by-month basis, 
for maximum of 36 months, if they will not reach 30th birthday by June 
30 of year graduation and commissioning are anticipated 
 High school graduation or equivalency certificate by August 1 of year of 
entrance into four-year NROTC Scholarship program 
 No moral obligations or personal convictions that prevent conscientious 
bearing of arms and supporting and defending the Constitution of the 
United States against all enemies, foreign or domestic 
 Physically qualified by Navy or Marine Corps standards 
 Students w/30 or more semester hours or 45 or more quarter hours of 
college credit upon application or students already enrolled in NROTC 
College Program are not eligible for four-year NROTC Scholarships; 
these students should see professors of naval science at host university's 
NROTC unit to discuss other scholarship opportunities. 
b.  Direct Accession and the Health Professions Loan Repayment 
Program (DA and HPLRP) 
The most direct means of entering the Navy Nurse Corps is through direct 
accession. An individual with a Bachelor or Master degree in nursing can apply for 
“direct” commission into the Navy Nurse Corps. Currently, the NNC is offering a college 
loan repayment program called the Health Professions Loan Repayment Program 
(HPLRP) to those nurses qualified for direct accession. They offer a $20,000 or $30,000 
sign-on bonus, based on a three-year or four-year service commitment, respectively for 
direct accessions without the HPLRP. The other option is a $20,000 sign-on bonus and up 
to $40,000 to help repay nursing school loans, based on a five-year service commitment 
(Navy Nurse Corps, 2010). 
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c.  Navy College Program (NCP) 
The NCP is aimed at helping high school students enter the Navy Nurse 
Corps. The program will pay up to $34,000 for a student to attend an accredited nursing 
school. It offers eligible student an initial grant of $10,000 followed by $1,000 a month 
for 24 months (Navy Nurse Corps, 2010). 
d.  Medical Enlisted Commissioning Program (MECP) 
According to the NKO website, MECP is a commissioning program 
offering qualified enlisted men and woman from all enlisted ratings a chance to earn an 
entry-level nursing degree followed by an appointment as an Ensign in the Nurse Corps. 
MECP is open to active duty enlisted sailors and marines with any rating or specialty. If 
accepting into the highly competitive program, individuals will receive full pay and 
benefits of their pay grades while going to school in pursuit of a Bachelor’s Degree in 
Nursing (BSN). MECP students may use their Montgomery G.I. Bill, as well as other 
outside financial assistance to pay for schooling. The tuition, books, and fees are the 
responsibility of the member. Upon completion of their BSN, the officer candidate will 
be commissioned an Ensign in United States Navy Nurse Corps. They will incur an 
obligated service period of 2 years per 1 year of time in the program. They must pass the 
national Nursing Licensure exam, commonly called the NCLEX in order to practice as a 
registered nurse. 
The requirements for the program are taken directly from the website and 
listed below. 
 U.S. Citizenship (No Waivers)  
 Opened to all rates and rank  
 Applicant must be commissioned prior/before reaching their 42nd birthday 
(No Waivers)  
 No high school transcripts are required. (NOT REQUIRED)  




 A minimum of 30 semester hours (or 45 quarter hours) of undergraduate 
courses accepted for transfer towards a bachelor's degree in nursing (BSN) 
by the institution(s) for which you are applying. Courses, such as English, 
Psychology, Biology, Chemistry, Physiology, etc. are desirable. 
 Cumulative GPA of at least 2.5 on a 4.0 scale 
 SAT or ACT test taken within the past 3 years from application due date 
 Must complete all requirements for a BSN within 36 months or less 
 No history of felony conviction or any record of drug abuse. A driving 
under the influence (DUI/DWI) violation is disqualifying if within four 
years of the application deadline, or convicted of any misdemeanors 
(except minor traffic violations) within three years of the application 
deadline. 
 Have no record of courts-martial convictions or civilian felony convictions 
 Security Clearance, contact your Security Management Office. JPAS 
security investigation printout is acceptable. 
 Favorable endorsement from commanding officer (NKO, 2009) 
e.  Seaman to Admiral Program (STA-21) 
The Seaman to Admiral program is designed to help highly motivated and 
well qualified enlisted sailor earn a college degree and enter the active duty 
commissioned ranks. The program was begun in earnest, in 1994. It was the brainchild 
of, then Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Admiral Mike Boorda. Admiral Boorda was 
the only Chief of Naval Operations to rise to that prestigious post from the enlisted ranks. 
He believed in the leadership capabilities and professional qualities of the enlisted sailors. 
The Broaded Opportunity for Officer Selection and Training or BOOST 
program with the Nurse Corps option was one of the many enlisted commissioning 
programs that merged into the STA-21 program (STA-21, 2009). The current STA-21 
program offers selectees the advantage of continuing to receive their current military pay, 
allowances, and special pays, while also paying up to $10,000 a year for tuition, fees, and 
books at an accredited nursing school that is NROTC affiliated. They are eligible for 
enlisted advancement opportunities while in the program; in addition, participants are 
authorized to use their Montgomery GI Bill (MGIB) benefits to offset cost not fully  
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covered by the program. Upon completion of the STA-21 program with the Nurse Corps 
option, candidates are commissioned as active Ensigns in the United States Navy Nurse 
Corps (STA-21, 2009). 
The following requirements are taken directly from the Nurse Corps 
community webpage on the website Navy Knowledge Online (NKO, 2009).  
 Applicants must be at least 18 years old and be able to complete degree 
requirements and commissioned by age 42 
 STA-21 Nurse Corps Option participants are exempt from the two 
semester Calculus, but are required to meet the math and science 
requirements of their Nursing degree program 
 The STA-21 Nurse Corps Option is available only at specially identified 
NROTC affiliated colleges or universities with nursing programs that 
confer a Baccalaureate Degree in Nursing that is accredited by the 
National League for Nursing Accrediting Commission (NLNAC) or the 
Commission on Collegiate Nursing Education (CCNE) 
 Applicants must have a cumulative grade point average (GPA) of 2.5 on a 
4.0 scale and have accepted by the university to which applying, a 
minimum of 45 quarter, or 30 semester credit hours in undergraduate 
nursing prerequisite courses (general English, general math, psychology*, 
biology*, chemistry*, organic chemistry*, anatomy and physiology*, 
microbiology*, nutrition*, sociology*, PE class, and history; although 
some of these courses fit your general degree requirements, it is very 
important to get the science (*) classes completed in order to be prepared 
to enter into the sequential nursing curriculum). Credit hours may be a 
combination of traditional classroom courses, College Level Entry 
Program (CLEP) credit, on-line or distance learning programs, or military 
training credits provided the school to which the application is made 
accepts the non-traditional credits. 
 Upon completion of the Bachelor of Science Nursing degree, member 
must successfully pass the National Council Licensing Examination-
Registered Nurse (NCLEX-RN) as required by SECNAVINST 1120.6 
Series. Professional licensing is required to practice nursing 
 Minor physical defects, non-organic in nature, may be waived. A person 
who is drug or alcohol dependent, abuses drugs or alcohol, or whose pre-
service abuse of drugs or alcohol indicates a proclivity to continue abuse 
in the service or who has a record of any drug trafficking offenses is 
ineligible. 
 STA-21 Nurse Corps Option selectees will incur a five-year active duty 
obligation upon commissioning 
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4. Retention Programs 
a.  Duty Under Instruction—Full Time (DUINS) 
The DUINS program is one the most popular and effective tools the NNC 
has for retaining mid-grade officers. Each year the program solicits applications for 
approximately 70 opportunities for a Nurse Corps officer to attend graduate school. 
Highly qualified candidates are offered full military pay and benefits based on their 
current rank. If selected for the program, the Navy Medical Department pays full tuition 
and fees an accredited university for the specific nursing specialty they were selected for 
(NKO, 2009). Time in the DUINS program counts toward time in rank for promotion 
purposes in addition to retirement. After graduation, an obligated service period is 
determined based upon the program and the amount of time required to graduate (NKO, 
2009).  
b.  Health Professions Loan Repayment Program (HPLRP) 
HPLRP is a retention tool used to address the shortage of junior to mid-
grade Nurse Corps officers. HPLRP is an accession and retention program that assists in 
the repayment of qualified tuition and educational expense loans in exchange for an 
obligated period of active duty (NKO, 2009). Personnel submit a request for the 
repayment of their qualified student loans via a selection board or committee. If selected 
for the program the officer is obligated to serve a minimum of two years active duty 
service. 
c.  Incentive Specialty Pay (ISP)  
ISP enhances the Navy Nurse Corps ability to retain certain nurses with 
critical skills and education. It targets specific specialties within the Navy Nurse Corps 
community that are determined to be in critical need. Critical need specialties are areas of 
nursing, such as psychiatric nursing, Peri-operative nursing, critical care nursing, Family 
Nurse Practitioners, Pediatric Nurse Practitioners, women care providers, and Mental 
health Practitioners. There are essentially two types of ISP’s (NKO, 2009). The CRNA-
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ISP targets Certified Nurse Anesthetist and RN-ISP are aimed at all other critical need 
specialties. The programs pay a monetary bonus to specialty trained Nurse Corps Officers 
who meet eligibility requirements in exchange for an obligated period of active 
duty within that specific specialty of one to four years as defined in the contract. The 
program pays between $5,000 to $20,000 per to individuals with less than 12 months of 
initial obligated service in exchange for an additional 1 to 4 years of active duty service 
(NKO, 2009). 
d.  Navy Nurse Corps Anesthesia Program (NNCAP) 
NNCAP is a highly coveted program in the Navy Nurse Corps 
community. The applicants are selected from a highly qualified pool of candidates to 
attend the Uniform Services University in Washington, D.C.. The program is national 
recognized, annually as the third best program in the country by “U.S. News and World 
Reports.” It allows Navy Nurse Corps Officers to attain their master's degree and 
advanced practice license as a Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetist (CRNA) while 
receiving full pay and allowances (NKO, 2009). The Navy Medical Department pays 
tuition. The time spent in the program counts toward time in rank for promotion purposes 
and retirement. After graduation, individual must obligate themselves to 4.5 years of 
service. 
C.  MAJOR RETENTION CONCERNS FOR THE NURSE CORPS 
The issues of retaining junior Navy Nurse Corps (NNC) officers, has consistently 
plagued the Nurse Corps community for more than two decades. Essentially, this is not a 
new phenomenon, but simply one that is becoming increasingly more palpable. In 1990, 
LCDR Penny Turner, noted in a Master thesis, at the Naval Postgraduate School that the 
difficulties experienced by the Nurse Corps in recruiting junior officers and the inability 
to retain them after their obligation periods was resulting in a large gap in the middle 




focus more attention on retention efforts of junior officers versus recruiting. At that time, 
the NNC was meeting 90 percent of its recruiting goals, yet have no measurement for 
assessing its retention efforts (Turner, 1990). 
Currently, retaining prior enlisted NNC officers is a major concern for Medical 
Manpower experts. Most, if not all prior enlisted Nurse Corps officers are eligible to 
retire from active duty after 10 years of obligated commissioned service. Furthermore, 
this particular demographic group of NNC officers represents those officers, 
significantly, more likely to be retained according a quantitative study conducted at that 
Naval Postgraduate School. However, there are very few monetary or non-monetary 
incentives offer to them when they are making their decision to stay in the Navy or retire. 
The majority of them acquire a commission via the Medical Enlisted Commissioning 
Program (MECP). LCDR Scott Messmer, a Navy Nurse Corps Manpower Systems 
Analyst, and Kimberly Pizanti in their Master’s thesis, concluded that the MECP is one 
of two accession sources with the “greatest positive effect on active NNC retention 
(Messmer, 2007). Messmer and Pizanti were concerned that increasing the number 
MECP participants would not simply fix the problem. They predicted it would create 
another problem of decreasing the number of senior officers, since many prior-enlisted 
NNC officers exercise their right to retire after their obligation expires (Messmer, 2007). 
Their observation supports the need for monetary and non-monetary incentive programs 
aimed at this group of officers.  
D.  GAO REPORT ON MEDICAL OFFICERS ACCESSION AND 
RETENTION 
In April 2009, the Senate Armed Services Committee received a detailed report 
from the Government Office of Accountability (GAO) called “Military Personnel: Status 
of Accession, Retention, and End Strength for Military Medical Officers, and Preliminary 
Observations Regarding Accession and Retention Challenges.” The GAO was task to 
study the medical and dental personnel requirements for the Army, Navy, and Air Force 
(GAO, 2009). Furthermore, the organization was task with evaluating the medical 
workforce planning efforts throughout the Department of Defense to determine those 
medical specialties that have experienced the largest gaps between their needs and fill 
rates. They were charged with reporting the challenges that hinder the services’ ability to 
achieve their medical personnel goals, the plans each service has to resolve personnel 
shortfalls, and to examine the data from each service to determine whether they met their 
recruiting and retention goals. The full GAO Report is included in Appendix E. The 
follow chart illustrates the vast organizational structure of the Navy recruiting commands. 
 
 
Figure 4.   Organizational Chart for Department of Defense (From: GAO Analysis of 
DoD information. 2009) 
The GAO report thoroughly examined the present state of the Military medical 
department accession and retention efforts and the challenges they face. The Navy Nurse 
Corps community was one of the areas reviewed in the report, specifically looking at the 
shortage, accession efforts, and retention issues. The review revealed that for fiscal years 
2001 to 2008, the services did not meet most of their accession goals (GAO, 2009). 
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Furthermore, the active duty components of each service annual retention rates were 
between 87 percent and 94 percent. The active duty Navy specifically was consistently 
below its authorized end strength in four major areas, including Critical Care Nursing and 
Operating Room Nursing (GAO, 2009). The two specialties identified are mission 
essential to the NNC. In previous Chapters of this thesis, the conclusion was drawn that 
accession goals directly affect end strength, retention goals, and promotion opportunities 
for the Navy Nurse Corps. The GAO report concluded that there are a variety of reasons 
for the challenges faced in recruiting and retaining medical officers. They identified some 
of the difficulties are; (1) the limited supply of, and high demand for, qualified 
professionals; (2) the lower pay generally offered by the military compare to the private 
sector; (3) the stresses of deployment, and length and frequency of deployments; (4) the 
length of time they are required to commit to staying in the service (GAO, 2009). This 
thesis will show that some of these challenges become a major obstacle to retaining 
certain groups of NNC officers, also. 
 
 
Table 5.   Direct Accession Goals Met by the Services for Active Duty Nurses, Fiscal 
Years 2001 through 2008 (From: GAO Analysis of DOD Information, 2009) 
 28
 29
E.  CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSIS NAVAL MEDICAL PERSONNEL 
SURVEY 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a survey of Navy Medicine 
Personnel via focus group in April 2009. The briefing was titled, “Navy Medicine: Are 
We Taking Care of Our People?” The discussions attempted to examine the perspectives 
of junior and senior Navy Medical personnel. The focus was on topics related to 
deployments, career expectations, leadership, mentorship/support, leadership 
training/transition, and retention (Whitmore, Hill, & Bickett, 2009). Specifically of 
interest to this thesis are the focus groups conducted with a targeted group of Navy Nurse 
Corps. The report yielded interesting conclusions relevant to retention of junior NNC 
officers and prior-enlisted NNC officers.  
The target population in the study was junior NNC officers, Ensign to Lieutenant 
Junior Grade (O1–O3), prior-enlisted junior NNC officers (O1E–O3E), and Lieutenant 
Commanders (O4–O4E). The study identifies O4E as Lieutenant Commanders with 
prior-enlisted experience. However, although the study presents a rank of O4E, there is 
no current military rank for O4E. The population was formed from three locations 
including military medical centers and community hospitals, with 9 groups of 75 
participants, of which 73 percent were O1–O3, 27 percent were O4, and 55 percent were 
prior enlisted officers (Whitmore, Hill, & Bickett, 2009).  
The study found the overall Navy Medicine community was frustrated over the 
lack of predictability of assignments. Navy Nurse Corps officers specifically were 
frustrated due to conflicts in the organizational structure at some commands, nurses had 
no authority over the Hospital Corpsman (HM), which they are expected to lead 
(Whitmore, Hill, & Bickett, 2009). In many medical treatment facilities (MTF), the HM’s 
are managed by a Chief (E-7) or other senior enlisted member, and the RN is left out of 
the decision loop. Prior enlisted NNC officers felt their leadership opportunities were 
limited after joining the NNC community because they were treated the same as all new 
junior nurses (Whitmore, Hill, & Bickett, 2009). They felt their experience and leadership 
capability was not regarded as valuable by Senior NNC leadership. Many of the officers  
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interviewed revealed that the perception of the NNC’s limited understanding of family 
issues and concerns about the mismatch of assignments with career goals would affect 
their decision to stay in the Navy (Whitmore, Hill, & Bickett, 2009). 
The studied focused heavily on the perceptions of junior and prior enlisted NNC 
officers. The officers in the study identified a number of challenges that may be address 
with the implementation of targeted non-monetary incentives or NMI’s. The CNA study 
found that junior officers at medical centers felt they did not receive enough support from 
their leadership and some found difficulty in finding mentorship (Whitmore, Hill, & 
Bickett, 2009). They felt that the NNC was too competitive and some officers are 
reluctant to provide mentorship and guidance out of fear it may improve the odds of a 
junior officer or their peer receiving promotion opportunities beyond their own. A portion 
of them reported that, “if the highly competitive culture of NNC would change,” they 
may be lead to stay in the Navy longer. Additionally, some junior NNC officer admitted 
that they rather go a prior enlisted peer for information and guidance versus their senior 
NNC officer. The full results of the CNA report can be viewed in Appendix C. 
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Figure 5.   Reason Navy Nurse Corps Officers Leave the Navy  
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Most O1–O3 and O1E–O3E mentioned that the reason they joined the NNC was 
for financial reasons, such as better pay, educational funding, or to pay off college debts. 
Therefore, pay was not their noted reason for being dissatisfied with the NNC. Mostly, 
the nurses in the survey were not satisfied with the lack of availability in terms of 
mentorship and guidance from seniors. The competitive culture as it relates to 
advancement and promotion, the NNC’s lack of empathy for family issues, lack of 
leadership opportunities for those prior enlisted officers, lack of flexibility when selecting 
nurses for deployment (voluntary vs. non-voluntary selectees), and lack of control when 
it comes to their career paths were cited as negative contributors to recruitment and 
retention. The CNA report found that incentives, such as retirement benefits, medical and 
dental benefits, patriotism, monetary compensation, job security, career assignment, 
sabbaticals, choice of assignments, and family support had a greater than 50 percent 
positive effect on their decision to stay in the NNC. Most of the items identified by the 
junior NNC officers are NMI’s (Whitmore, Hill, & Bickett, 2009). Additionally, they are 
identical or similar to the NMI’s valued by other officer communities like Surface 
Warfare Officers, identified in previous studies (Browning & Burr, 2009). The full report 
released to the Navy Nurse Corps leadership at the Bureau of Navy Medicine is included 
in Appendix D. 
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Figure 5. Reason Navy Nurse Corps Officers Stay in the Navy 
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F.  AUCTION MECHANISMS 
1. Defining Auction  
The use of auctions, for the exchange of goods and services, is a practice dating 
back to ancient Greek civilizations. The idea or definition of auction can be found in 
many reference books, with vary degrees of similarities in them. For the purpose of this 
research, we will focus on one of the following similar description of an auction: 
 According to Encarta Dictionary, an auction is “a sale of goods or 
property at which intending buyers bid against one another for individual 
items, each of which is sold to the bidder offering the highest price” 
(Encarta, 2010) 
 Webster defines an auction simply as “the sale of property to the highest 
bidder” (Merriam-Webster, 2010) 
 Oxford Dictionary online explains that an auction is “a public sale in 
which goods or properties are sold to the highest bidder” (Oxford, 2010) 
 Planet Money, an online website looks at auction from a monetary angle. 
It explains, “an auction is also a process in which multiple parties bid to 
determine who will buy an item from a seller; generally, the bidder 
offering the highest price gets the item. Auctions can be open (bids are 
seen by other bidders) or sealed (bidders do not see other bids), and vary 
on many other dimensions. Auctions can be held when there are many 
identical items (such as securities); in this case, the price is set so that just 
enough bidders are willing to pay that price or higher to buy all of the 
units available. An auction can also be held where multiple sellers are 
selling an identical good to multiple buyers. Auctions are widely 
considered to be an efficient means of determining the fair value of an 
item” (Kwak, 2008). 
In accurate terms and indeed more applicable to this thesis, we will define an 
auction as an exchange mechanism. Most generally, an auction is “an economic 
mechanism whose purpose is the allocation of goods (or services) and the formation of 
prices for those goods (or services) via a process known as bidding” (Henderson, 2007). 
Figure 6 depicts the many variations of an auction mechanism. 
 
 Figure 6.   Auction Variations (From: Gates, Coughlan-Filip WEA, 2006) 
G.  EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 
The field of economics has grown to become one of most influential social 
sciences within the world of academia. In today’s political and economically negatively 
charged climate, leaders are constantly looking to economist for answers to their most 
pressing questions; jobs, labor markets, real estate markets, financial markets; global 
trade policies, and much more. Wikipedia defines economics as “the social science which 
studies the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services” (Wikipedia, 
Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, 2010). It goes on to further define the term, with a 
quote from a 1932 essay by Lionel Robbins, which states Economics is “the science 
which studies human behavior as a relationship between ends and scarce means which 
have alternative uses” (Wikipedia, Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia, 2010). A more 
direct definition is that economics is the branch of social science that deals with the 
production and distribution and consumption of goods and services and their 
management (Wordnet, 2010). Therefore, economists are academic scholars and 
practitioners that study these economic conditions, labor market behavior, and human 
decision-making phenomena. Experimental economics is a relatively recent form of 
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examining economic phenomena. The idea that research in labor market behavior could 
be examined in a laboratory setting, actually began in the late 1940’s and early 1950’s. 
C.A. Holts describes it as, “the systematic evaluation of economic theories under 
controlled laboratory conditions” (Holts & Davis, 1993). Economist traditional use very 
sophisticated and time tested statistical models to examine the observable behaviors of 
“natural” markets. However, these models are unable to consistently, and accurately 
predict the small subtle behavioral changes that occur from the chaos inherit in natural 
data.  
H.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The literature review detailed the current literature and scholarly information 
related to the national nursing shortage and its implications, retention of junior nurses in 
NNC, scarcity of resources in the NNC, a brief introduction to auction mechanisms, and a 
brief description of experimental economics. The purpose is to provide a clear direction 
for the methodological approaches used in this research. The reader should have a basic 
understanding, and foundational knowledge from the literature review to understand the 
background, purpose, and goals of this thesis.  
 36
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
III. RETENTION MECHANISMS 
A.  INTRODUCTION TO AUCTION MECHANISMS 
1. Types of Auctions 
As research continues to provide valuable knowledge about the effectiveness and 
cost savings characteristics of auction mechanisms, they will become a vital tool for 
military manpower leadership and management. This chapter will explore the various 
types of auctions and briefly describe their characteristics. It is important to understand 
the different characteristics of auction mechanisms. Although, the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism is the primary auction used in this research, it borrows a 
few characteristics from a number of different auction types. Figure 7 further describes 
the directional variations of an auction mechanism.  
 
 
Figure 7.   Auction Variations and Related Market Forces 
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a.  Single-Winner Forward Auction 
In this type of auction, there is a “single” winner and they are also the 
highest bidder. A forward auction is similar to the type of auction experience one may 
have on an internet site, such as Ebay or a merchandiser, such as Christie’s auction house. 
It usually characterized by a single seller for multiple buyers. Ideally, the participant or 
buyer who places the most value on the good or service offered by the seller will bid the 
highest and win.  
b.  Single-Winner Reverse Auction 
This type of auction tends to have a “single” winner; however, they are the 
lowest bidder. A reverse auction is characterized by a single buyer being able to select 
from the bids of multiple sellers. An example would be the United State Navy, which is a 
single buyer of manpower, and potential accessions are offering their services as sellers 
of manpower. One of the primary objectives of reverse auction is to drive prices 
downward. Figure 8 describes the most common types of auctions.  
 
 
Figure 8.   Types of Auction Mechanisms (From: Gates, Coughlan-Filip WEA, 2006) 
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2. Ascending and Descending Open-Bid Auctions 
a.  Ascending 
Open Bid Auction (Ascending): The bidders openly declare the amounts 
they are bidding or their intentions. The auctioneer starts at a minimum amount and 
incrementally increases it until there are no more takers in the bidding process. The 
winner is the highest bidder. In an ascending-price auction, the agent can bid while the 
price is less than its lower bound, and drop out when the price is greater than its upper 
bound. Ascending auctions are often referred to as “English” auctions… 
b.  Descending 
Open Bid Auction (Descending): The bidders openly declare their bids or 
intentions. The auctioneer starts at a high amount (one that no one is likely to take) and 
incrementally decreases it until a bidder accepts the price. Descending auctions are 
commonly called “Dutch Auctions.” 
3. Sealed-Bid Auctions 
a.  First Price 
Sealed Bid Auction (First Price): Participants in the auction will submit 
bids, usually simultaneously, without disclosure (sealed) until a clear winner is 
determined. The winner will be the participant with the highest bid. In turn, the winner 
pays the amount they bid. 
b.  Second Price 
Sealed Bid Auction (Second Price Auction): Participants in the auction 
will submit bids, usually simultaneously, without disclosure (sealed), until the winner is 
determined. The winner will also be the participant with the highest bidder. However, the 
winner pays the amount bid by the second highest bid (or first excluded). 
4. Reverse Sealed-Bid Second Price Auction 
Reversed Second Price Seal Bid Auction: There is only one buyer (the Navy) with 
multiple sellers or bidder (the officers and/or their services). The bids are submitted 
without disclosure (sealed) until the winner is determined. The winner in this type of 
auction is the lowest (reverse) bidder. The price the Navy will buy those services will be 
at the rate of the second highest bidder. A reverse auction is one where multiple parties 
bid to determine who will sell an item to a buyer; in this case, the seller offering the 
lowest price gets to sell it (Kwak, 2008). 
 
 
Figure 9.   Types of Auctions Define by Actions of Bidder  
5. Value Driven Bidding Strategies 
It important to understand the optimal bidding strategies to examine individual 
decision making behaviors in simulations, experiments, and ultimately, implementing 
CRAM. In Zimmerman’s (2008) research, she clearly illustrates in detail this optimal 
bidding strategy in second-price auctions and its effects on the process. These bidding 
strategies are humanistic economical behaviors where bidders seek to optimize their 
utility value by bidding at or above their true value in a second-price or first-price 
auction, respectively. Therefore, this further illustrates that a second-price auctions and 
CRAM specifically, can be applicable to any officer community, including the Navy 
Nurse Corps.  
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Zimmerman explains, under a second-price auction, the optimal bidding strategy 
is to bid your true valuation. For example, if you are bidding (in a forward auction) to 
purchase an item that is worth $30 to you (in other words, you would be willing to pay a 
maximum of $30 for the item), then your best strategy is to bid exactly $30 for the item 
in a second-price auction. To understand this result more clearly, this section will 
illustrate how a person can never do better than by bidding truthfully in a second-price 
auction. For simplicity, the explanation that follows employs the following notation 
(Zimmerman, 2008):  
 
V = Your value for the object  
P = Price paid for the object  
S = Your surplus  
B = Your bid for the object  
H = Highest bid submitted by any other bidder  
Figures 10 and 11 graphically depict the value to cost evaluation by a single 
bidder in an auction. The following section has been taken from Zimmerman’s work on 
second-price auctions and CRAM. It will first demonstrate that bidding above one’s true 
value, for example choosing (B > V) can only harm the bidder and bidding below one’s 
your true value is harmful also, for example choosing (B < V) (Lay, 2009). The following 
figures illustrate three possible cases or outcomes, which can result from bidding above 
your true value, and three outcomes for bidding below your true value. Furthermore, if 
you do not submit the highest bid (i.e., if B < H), then S = 0. If you do submit the highest 
bid (i.e., if B > H), then P = H and your surplus is given by S = V - P = V – H (Lay, 
2009). The explanations for bidding strategies and their valuations was taken from Lay 
(2009). 
 Figure 10.   Bidding Above One’s Valuation (From: Zimmerman, 2008) 
 
Figure 11.   Bidding Below One’s Valuation (From: Zimmerman, 2008) 
a.  Bidding Above Your True Value 





(1) Case A1. If H>B>V, then here, because H > B, you are not 
the high bidder and do not win the object, therefore S = 0. If you bid truthfully (B = V), 
you also do not win the object (because H > V), and therefore, would also have S = 0. 
Thus, bidding above your true value provides no benefit in this case.  
(2) Case A2. If B>V>H, then here, because B > H, you are the 
high bidder and win the object, therefore S = V - H > 0. If you bid truthfully (B = V), 
however, you also win the object (because V > H), and therefore, would also have S = V 
- H. Thus, bidding above your true value provides no benefit in this case, either.  
(3) Case A3. If B>H>V, then here, because B > H, you are the 
high bidder and win the object, therefore S = V - H, which is negative, because H > V: 
you “win” the object, but pay more than it is worth to you. If you bid truthfully (B = V), 
on the other hand, you would not win the object (because H > V), and therefore, would 
have S = 0. Thus, bidding above your true value hurts you in this case. You would be 
better off bidding truthfully.  
b.  Bidding Below Your True Value 
(1) Case B1. If H>V>B, then here we find, because H > B, you 
are not the high bidder and do not win the object, therefore S = 0. If you bid truthfully (B 
= V), you also do not win the object (because H > V), and therefore, would also have S = 
0. Bidding below your true value provides no benefit in this case.  
(2) Case B2. If V>B>H, then here we find, because B > H, you 
are the high bidder and win the object, therefore S = V - H > 0. If you bid truthfully (B = 
V), you also win the object (because V > H), and therefore, would also have S = V - H. 
Thus, bidding below your true value provides no benefit in this case.  
(3) Case B3. If V>H>B, then here we find, because H > B, you 
are not the high bidder and do not win the object, therefore S = 0. If you bid truthfully (B 
= V), on the other hand, you would win the object (because V > H), and therefore, would 
have S = V - H, which is positive because V > H. Thus, bidding below your true value 
hurts you in this case. You would be better off bidding truthfully.  
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As a result, the optimal strategy in a second-price auction, with a single 
winner, is to bid your true value. This result is easily extended to the case with multiple 
winners. In this case, all winning bidders are paid a price equal to the first excluded 
bidder (e.g., with 20 winning bidders, the 21st highest price). The opposite holds for a 
second-price reverse auction with multiple winners (e.g., with 20 winners the 20 lowest 
bidders are paid the amount bid by the 21st lowest bid). With multiple winners, this is 
referred to as a uniform price auction. 
6. First-Price Sealed-Bid Reverse Auction Bidding Strategies 
In a first-price sealed-bid reverse auction, the winning (lowest) bidder would win 
the auction and pay the price bid. In a reverse auction with multiple winners, the lowest 
price bidders would win the right to supply the item and they would be paid a price equal 
to their actual bid. This is referred to as a discriminatory price auction. At first glance, 
this would seem to be more cost-effective because the buyer is not over-paying for the 
lower cost suppliers. 
However, the bidding strategy is more complicated for a first price sealed bid 
auction. The optimal strategy in the discriminatory-price auction is not to bid one’s true 
value, but instead to raise your bid somewhat above your true value. Each individual 
should try to estimate what others are bidding and then bid just below the expected cutoff 
(the first excluded bid). This allows an individual to win the auction while maximizing 
their surplus. Note that if bidders are right on average, the discriminatory price auction 
yields the same total cost outcome as the uniform price auction. At the same time, a 
discriminatory price reverse auction may be more cost effective if bidders are risk averse. 
As risk aversion increases, bidders will lower their bids to increase their probability of 
winning the auction, even at the sacrifice of their expected. As a final issue, which should 
not be ignored, each winning bidder receives a different payment. In a retention bonus 
auction, the discriminatory-price auction mechanism creates unequal compensation and 
may result in morale issues and tension within the operating. 
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B. COMBINATORIAL RETENTION AUCTION MECHANISMS (CRAM) 
Understanding the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism will be the key 
to understanding how this tool can help the Navy Nurse Corps retain valuable human 
capital with the knowledge, skills, and abilities they require. Auctions were explained, 
briefly in previous chapters for recognition of their value. Tuomas Sandholm from the 
computer science department at Carnegie Mellon University says: Combinatorial 
auctions, that is, auctions where bidders can bid on combinations of items, tend to lead to 
more efficient allocations than traditional auction mechanisms in multi-item auctions 
where the agents' valuations of the items are not additive (Sandholm, 2002). The idea of 
Combinatorial Auctions was first proposed by Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin (1982), for the 
allocation of airport landing slots (Combinational, 2010). This idea is further explained 
by Dr. David Park, in his dissertation at University Pennsylvania noted that auctions offer 
great promise as mechanisms for optimal resource allocation in complex distributed 
systems with self-interested agents (Parks, 2001). Although, his worked was related to 
the use combinatorial auction mechanisms in e-commerce, it remains relevant in 
explaining the diverse industries in which Combinatorial Auction mechanisms have been 
found to be effective. 
1. Introduction to CRAM 
Combinatorial Retention Auctions Mechanisms have been researched, defined, 
and explained in a number of theses. However, the most complete and detailed definition 
and explanation of this auction mechanism and the advantages of using CRAM, can be 
found in research performed by Coughlan, Gates, and Zimmerman (2008). Much of this 
introduction will focused on their research to understand the dynamics of an auction 
mechanism, such as CRAM. Yet, a brief explanation of the elements that make up 
CRAM may be appropriate at this time. Richard Lay (2009) explains that CRAM as 




(1) A second-price auction that helps ensures accuracy when setting a 
bonus levels. 
(2) A non-monetary incentive (NMI) component, which reduces cost for 
the Navy Nurse Corps to retain officers when the officer’s value > cost for 
those NMI’s offered. 
(3) A combinatorial auction provides the individual with a more complete 
and valued incentive package with little or no “waste.” (Lay, 2009) 
2. The CRAM Process 
The CRAM process is again a cost efficient and effective retention tool being 
tested in academic and experimental environments for possible use by Navy leadership. 
The process works as follows. 
 A service member or Navy Nurse Corps Officer states: 
 The minimum cash bonus required to retain him or her in Navy. 
 Then, the acceptable reduction in the cash bonus for each non-
monetary incentive they wish to obtain, including a combination or 
package of NMI’s. 
 The entity instituting the auction: 
 Calculates the minimum cost package for the bid they received. 
Keeping in mind that a bid  package includes any NMI with a 
value > cost. The cash bonus is reduced by the value of the 
incentive included in the package. The cost of the entire package 
will be the cost of the NMI’s and the provisional cash bonus. 
 Calculates the set of lowest cost packages submitted by service 
members, thereby, calculated which members cost the least to 
retain. 
 Each service member or in this case Navy Nurse Corps Officer retained by 
the organization: 
 Receives the NMI they asked to be included in their package bid. 
 Receives the cash bonus equal to the total cost of the first-excluded 
bid package minus the cost of the NMI or NMI’s they selected, in 
the uniform-price CRAM variants explored to date. 
3. Example of CRAM 
As further illustration of how the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism 
operates, consider an example of the uniform-price CRAM retaining three Navy nurses 
and offering two NMIs, each costing the Navy $20,000. For this example, the Navy will 
retain two of these nurses and their NMI values are additive. Figure 10 illustrates such a 
scenario and how the uniform-price CRAM would be applied. The columns two through 
four in the figure show the nurses’ cash only costs to retain, and the values they receive 
from each of two NMIs, respectively. In a purely monetary uniform-price retention 
auction, the nurses would bid their true reservation values (column two). Thus, nurses 1 
and 2 would be retained at a bonus equal to nurse 3’s bid ($100,000), and the total cost to 
retain two nurses would be $200,000. Figure 12 demonstrates the decision-making 
process in clear numerical detail. 
 
 
Figure 12.   Decision Making Behavior in the CRAM Process (From: B. Zimmermen. 
2008) 
Under the uniform-price bid method CRAM, on the other hand, the sailors would 
also bid their true value for each of the NMIs; nurse 1 would be allocated NMI 1, nurse 2 
would be allocated NMI 2, and nurse 3 would be allocated both NMIs, resulting in the 
NMI costs and values shown in columns five and six, respectively. The military would 
then reduce the cash incentive bids by the nurses’ bids for the NMIs allocated, resulting 
in the revised cash retention bonuses depicted in column seven. The Navy’s cost to retain 





eight. Nurse 2 would be separated under CRAM and becomes the first excluded retention 
cost for the retained nurses, a cost of $80,000 per nurse. Hence, CRAM reduces the total 
cost to retain two nurses to $160,000, saving $40,000 with just two nurses. 
The final two columns in the figure show the cash bonus paid to each retained 
nurse (the military cost for the first excluded nurse minus the cost of NMIs awarded), and 
the total value received by each nurse (their cash bonus plus the value of the NMIs 
awarded). The nurses receive a $30,000 greater value than with a monetary auction alone, 
totaling $230,000, because of the NMIs provided. 
4. Valuing Combinations of Non-Monetary Incentives 
Any retention auction that trades off a monetary incentive for multiple non-
monetary incentives must recognize that the value of an NMI depends on what other 
NMIs are also provided. Much of the CRAM research to date has assumed a consistent 
independent additive effect for the value of NMIs; the value of any combination of NMIs 
is simply equal to the sum of the “stand-alone” values for those NMIs. However, this is 
not the likely case. If NMIs are complementary, their combined value may be super-
additive (or greater than the sum of the individual values); if NMIs are substitutes, their 
combined value is likely sub-additive, or less than the sum of the individual NMI values 
(Ellis, 2009). As a result, this research distinguishes between purely additive NMI values 
and combinatorial NMI values, instances where the combined NMI values are not purely 
additive. 
The disadvantage of combinatorial values is that it complicates the bid solicitation 
problem. If NMI values are not purely additive, the CRAM methodology described above 
must ask nurses to value the individual NMIs, as well as every possible NMI 
combination. With two NMIs, this requires four bids: cash only, each NMI in isolation, 
and the combination of two NMIs. As the number of NMIs increases, the number of bids 
required increases as 2n, where n is the number of NMIs. If there are 10 NMIs, nurses 
would need to submit 1024 (210) bids. Resolving this issue under the current CRAM 
variant would require either limiting the NMIs offer to a small set, which would 
significant limit CRAM’s potential advantages, or ignoring non-additive combinations of 
NMI values. Ignoring combinatorial NMI values can either over-value the NMI 
combination awarded, causing some nurses to decline their retention incentive package, 
or under-value the NMI combination causing the Navy to over-pay for retaining their 
target nursing end-strength. This thesis explores an alternative CRAM methodology, the 
menu method described below, that helps address the combinatorial value problem. 
5. CRAM Variants 
To understand how the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism works, it is 
important to first explain four CRAM variations, as each variation operates differently. 
The four CRAM variations are illustrated in Figure 13 and are classified based on two 






















Figure 13.   CRAM Variations 
6. NMI Allocation: Menu Method vs. Bid Method 
Under CRAM, NMIs can be allocated in one of two ways: the menu method or 
the bid method. Under the menu method, eligible nurse members are presented a list of 
the available NMIs, along with their associated Navy costs. Nurses would then select 
from this “menu” of NMIs and they will be granted any NMI selected, if retained. 
However, the Navy will include the combined cost of all NMIs selected as part of the 
cost to retain that nurse (see below). The nurse can select any combination of available 
NMIs, including none, one or all NMIs. Each nurse will maximize their net value by 
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determining the combination of NMIs that provides the greatest value relative to cost for 
them. Under the menu method, the nurse’s monetary bid reflects the cash he/she requires, 
above any NMIs selected. Thus, the monetary bids submitted under the menu method are 
“post-NMI” cash incentive bids. 
Under the bid method CRAM, nurses submit individual bids for each NMI 
offered, with the bid reflecting the cash bonus he/she would sacrifice to receive each 
particular NMI (if retained). The nurses would not be provided, ex ante, any costs 
associated with the NMIs, however they are granted any NMI for which they submit a bid 
greater than cost (if retained). As with the menu method, the Navy will include the 
combined cost of all NMIs allocated in calculating the cost to retain each nurse (see 
below). 
Under the bid method, unlike the menu method, a nurse’s bid for a monetary 
retention incentive reflects the cash amount he/she would require without receiving any 
NMIs. Without knowing NMI costs, the nurse would not know which NMIs he/she will 
be allocated when making the cash bid. The nurse’s combined bids for all NMIs allocated 
are subtracted from this “cash-only” monetary bid to determine the “post-NMI” cash 
incentive bid. The “post-NMI” cash incentive bid plus the cost of NMIs awarded 
determines each nurse’s total retention cost (see below). 
The primary advantage of menu method CRAM is that it accommodates 
combinatorial NMI values as described previously. Nurses presumably have some idea of 
their value for the various combinations of NMIs; they can incorporate these 
combinatorial values into their NMI package selection, choosing the NMI package whose 
combined value exceeds the combined cost by the greatest amount (this is the optimal 
choice). The primary disadvantage of the menu method CRAM, on the other hand, is that 
the cost of providing each NMI must be reasonably well known, and published, in 
advance, which can be particularly problematic for those NMIs whose cost depends on 
the number of nurses choosing that particular NMI. The bid method advantages and 
disadvantages are the mirror image of the menu method advantage and disadvantages: the 
bid method does not incorporate combinatorial NMI values effectively; however, the cost 
of each NMI does not necessarily need to be known in advance. 
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7. Determining Winners: Total Retention Cost 
After receiving all NMI selections or bids and all monetary incentive bids, the 
military service calculates the total retention cost for each service member. This cost is 
given by: 
 
Total Retention Cost = “Post-NMI” Cash Incentive Bid + Total Cost of Allocated NMIs 
 
The military service will then retain the set of lowest-total-cost service members. 
For example, if end-strength goals dictate that 2,000 service-members from a particular 
specialty in a particular grade must be retained in a particular year, then the military 
service will retain the 2,000 service-members among this group whose total retention 
costs are the 2,000 lowest costs. Each service member retained would then receive any 
NMIs allocated to him or her, as well as a cash bonus whose amount depends upon the 
pricing rule being used, as described in the next section. 
8. Price Determination: Discriminatory vs. Uniform 
The basic discriminatory-price and uniform-price auction rules were described in 
the early chapter on auction mechanisms. Under discriminatory-price CRAM variations, 
each retained nurse would receive the exact cash bonus requested; under the bid method, 
the nurse pays the amount bid for each NMI granted out of this bonus. Under the 
discriminatory-price CRAM, each retained nurse receives a cash bonus given by: 
 
Cash Bonus = “Post-NMI” Cash Incentive Bid 
Under a traditional uniform-price auction, all winning bidders pay or receive an 
amount equal to the first excluded bid. Under CRAM, each winning bidders receives a 
retention package (cash plus NMIs) whose total cost is equal to the first-excluded 
retention cost (the lowest total retention cost among those nurses not retained). Thus, 
under the uniform-price CRAM, each retained nurse receives a cash bonus given by: 
 
Cash Bonus = First Excluded Total Retention Cost – Total Cost of Allocated NMIs 
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Under all CRAM variations, the nurses’ total value includes the nurse’s cash 
bonus plus the value of any allocated NMIs. If nurses have bid for NMIs wisely, their 
individual values should exceed the cost for all allocated NMIs. Thus, the total value 
received by each nurse will always be either equal to or greater than the actual cost to 
retain that nurse. 
C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
In the uniform-price bid method, CRAM example described above, if the NNC 
planners wanted to retain two nurses, then nurse #1 and #3 would be the cost effective 
ones to retain. Each nurse would receive a package more valuable to them than the 
monetary incentives alone. CRAM is designed to be a “Win-Win” retention mechanism, 
which addresses the desires of the individual while keeping cost at a minimum. A portion 
of Zimmerman’s research is included in the Appendix B of this thesis for a more detailed 
examination of CRAM. This research further investigates the discriminatory-price and 
menu method CRAM variants to see if individuals make rational decision under these 
different methodological variants and to compare outcomes across methodologies. 
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
A.  BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
1. Purpose of the Experiment 
The purpose of the experiment, as well as the thesis itself, is to use an 
experimental approach to examine the decision-making behavior Navy Nurse Corps 
officers may demonstrate when making choices to stay in the Navy or separate from 
active duty. As discussed in previous chapters, NNC officers play significant value on 
certain monetary, as well as non-monetary incentives (NMI) when making retention 
decision. The NMI’s that NNC officers find the most valuable have been outline in 
Chapter II. Based on the experiments, this thesis will examine whether subjects in an 
experimental environment will make retention decision that consistently reflect value to 
the subject is greater than cost to the “Firm.”  
If subjects in a controlled experimental environment consistently make decisions, 
where value is greater than cost then such an experiment holds promise for the Nurse 
Corps. A Menu Method or Bid Method CRAM could prove to be cost effective and 
efficient to the NNC and a substantially better value driven incentive package for the 
individual officer or targeted community. Dr. Peter Coughlan and Dr. William Gates 
have designed and administered a number of labor market experiments at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California with promising results for the use of auction 
mechanism in the DoD. This experimental research builds upon much their research 
while providing a window into the multiple opportunities for the use of auction 
mechanisms in the NNC, specifically the CRAM Menu Method and Bid Method.  
2. Goal of the Experiment  
The goals of the experiment is to examine whether subjects in the experiment 
faced with a retention decision, in a controlled environment, under uncertain employment 
conditions, will reveal certain expected truths. The most significant to this thesis is that 
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these individuals make choices in attempt to maximize their value, and in turn those 
retention decisions will reflect their value > cost to the firm. The results of such an 
experiment, along with subsequent research related to CRAM would be invaluable to 
NNC leadership when deliberating about the best means of evaluating and producing 
retention options for targeted communities. The value of cost to the NNC is the one of the 
obvious reasons to look at the use of CRAM; however, total cost to the NNC would 
include intrinsic cost or opportunity cost incur by officers throughout their careers. 
Additionally, this human factor is very difficult to measure or predict without 
experimental research. W. Norton states in his Master thesis from the Naval Postgraduate 
School, that “identifying intrinsic cost requires the DOD to study humans and human 
behavior. The primary reason to conduct experiments is because they capture this human 
element” (Norton, 2007). CA Holts says, predictions are often based on very subtle 
behavioral assumption for which there is little practical possibility of obtaining evidence 
from naturally occurring markets (Holts & Davis, 1993). In turn, this means that 
experiments are required to obtain such data. 
B.  TYPE OF ECONOMIC EXPERIMENTS 
A large portion of the research methodology and detailed descriptions of labor 
economic theory, as well as experimental economics and experiment design comes from 
W. Norton, a research assistant and graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School. For 
detailed definitions and an in depth examination of experimental economics, a portion of 
his work can be viewed in Appendix G. However, some brief descriptions of basic 
economic theories may prove pertinent to this research, so they are reviewed in this 
section.  
1. Market Theory 
Market Experiment or Price Theory experiments are an early example of 
economist attempting to study a natural market. As mentioned in Norton’s work, Edward 
Chamberlin was one of the early pioneers of labor market experiments (Norton, 2007). 
He was an economist during the late 1940s to early 1950s who began using laboratory 
methods to study economics and test his market theories. He created a demand and cost 
structure in a simulated market by dealing his graduate students a deck of cards with cost 
and values on them, and essentially instructing them trade or sell between each. After 
running the experiment several times, Chamberlin was able draw some conclusions about 
the behavior of his student in this competitive, unregulated free market. He recorded the 
aggregate results and established a buyer’s demand curve and sellers supply curve. He 
concluded that equilibrium is observed where these demand and supply curves or price 
and quantity intersect. His experiments with graduate students help form one of the first 
basic conceptual forms of experimental economic, which focuses on the trade-off 
between value or and cost. Figure 14 illustrates Chamberlin supply and demand curves. 
 
 
Figure 14.   Induce Supply and Demand Curves (From: Chamberlin, 1948) 
2. Game Theory 
Game theory attempts to mathematically capture behavior in strategic situations, 
in which an individual's success in making choices depends on the choices of others 
(Game Theory, 2010). It has become a mainstay in economic theory and experimental 
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economics at most business school throughout the country. Game theory can actually be 
traced back as early as the 1920s when researchers began to develop the economic model 
as a unique and extensive field of study. Game theory is used to describe the interaction 
of rational agents under precisely specified information and action conditions (Holts & 
Davis, 1993). “The Prison’s Dilemma” or “Two Dilemma” is an early and precise 
illustration of the basic concepts of Game Theory. 
The example used in Figure 15 depicts two people, Prisoner A and Prisoner B, 
who are faced with a dilemma. The local police have arrested both individuals on 
suspicion of perpetrated a serious crime. Each prisoner is locked in an interrogation 
room, being intensely interviewed by the police. The police give both prisons the option 
to implicate the other in the crime and receive a lighter sentence. If Prison A (PA) 
implicates Prison B (PB) in the crime, and PB remains silent, then PA will receive NO 
time in prison, while PB receives 10 years. If the opposite occurs and PB implicates PA, 
and PA remains silent then PB receives no jail time, while PA is sentence to 10 years. If 
neither of the prisons decides to speak with the police, they will each serve two years. 
However, if both Prisons implicate each other, they both will serve five years in prison. 
The decision matrix demonstrates how both PA and PB would be better off if they both 
remained silent. However, they are isolated and neither is aware of what the other will do 
or the incentives they are being offered. Therefore, if each prison desires to maximize 









 Prisoner B Stays Silent Prisoner B Betrays 
Prisoner A Stays Silent
Each serves 2 years 
(2, 2) 
Prisoner A: 10 years 
Prisoner B: goes free 
(10, 0) 
Prisoner A Betrays 
Prisoner A: goes free
Prisoner B: 10 years 
(0, 10) 
Each serves 4 years 
(4, 4) 
Figure 15.   The Prison’s Dilemma Example (From: Game Theory, Wikipedia, 2010) 
3. Individual Decision Theory 
The individual decision theory involves attempting to quantify the behavior of 
individuals making decisions or choices relevant to their personal utility with uncertain 
conditions. According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, a detailed explanation for this 
theory in statistics, it is a set of quantitative methods for reaching optimal decisions. A 
solvable decision problem must be capable of being tightly formulated in terms of initial 
conditions and choices or courses of action, with their consequences (Decision Theory, 
2010). In general, such consequences are not known with certainty but are expressed as a 
set of probabilistic outcomes. Each outcome is assigned a “utility” value based on the 
preferences of the decision maker. An optimal decision, following the logic of the theory, 
is one that maximizes the expected utility (Decision Theory, 2010). Individual Decision 
Theory is most relevant to Menu Method CRAM and Bid Method CRAM experiments 
conducted for this thesis. Each process involves individuals making a decision about their 
overall compensation, face with the uncertainty of the auction process. 
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C.  EXPERIMENT PURPOSE 
The experiment tested whether an individual would bid rationally when facing 
decisions involving a cash salary and interdependent combinations of two NMIs. 
Experimental subjects are one of a hundred employees at Firm A choosing whether to 
continue employment at Firm A; each participant compete against 99 simulated Firm A 
employees. In the scenario, Firm A is downsizing by 50 percent. Another generic 
company, Firm B, has offered to employ all former employees from Firm A, representing 
the participant’s opportunity cost of employment at firm A. This is what the bidder could 
earn if they left Firm A. Subjects have no preference for either firm and are only 
interested in maximizing their personal compensation, including cash salary and the value 
of any NMIs awarded. Experimental subjects submit a salary request to Firm A and either 
select a package of NMIs (menu method CRAM) or bid on alternative combinations of 
NMIs (bid method CRAM). Firm A retains the 50 lowest cost employees. Experimental 
subjects are compensated based on the total value of their compensation (cash and NMI 
value) in each round. The experiment was designed without a military context to remove 
bias. The decisions presented were identical to what a service member would experience 
in making their retention decision. 
The experiment involves 30 trials and is broken into three treatments, (10) purely 
monetary, (10) independent NMIs (additive values), and (10) combinatorial NMIs (with 
potentially sub-additive or super-additive values). The trials are conducted in a pyramid 
style, as shown in Table 6. The pyramid style gradually introduces complexity into the 
process and identifies learning effects by later eliminating the complexity. The 
experiments were conducted using both the discriminatory and uniform price auction 
mechanism and compare the menu and bid method alternatives. This thesis will only 
report the discriminatory price auction results.  
 Table 6.   Experiment Structure 
CRAM requires individuals to understand the value they receive from various 
combinations of NMIs; it is important to evaluate if bidders make the correct selection 
while facing super- and sub-additive NMIs. Inefficient decisions may cause separation 
and retention errors. For example, consider the case where NMIs are super-additive. The 
individual could want and could have been retained if the values of NMIs were properly 
calculated. If super additive values are not properly considered, this represents an 
inefficient separation; the individual could be separated when they should have been 
retained. Conversely, suppose values are sub-additive. If not properly considered, the 
bidder could be offered retention but would be better off at firm B. 
D.  OPTIMAL BIDDING STRATEGY: DISCRIMINATORY AUCTION 
Recall that a discriminatory auction is a first-price auction. In the experiment, 
those who submit the 50 lowest total cost bids are retained by Firm A and are paid the 
salary they each individually requested, assuming no NMIs are offered; those who submit 
the 50 highest total cost bids are laid off from Firm A and immediately work for Firm B 
at the amount previously offered. 
The subject must look at Firm B’s offer, which becomes the subject’s reservation 
wage, and then enter a salary request to Firm A. As previously discussed, if an individual 
was to bid truthfully in a discriminatory auction, he or she would not maximize their 
expected surplus value. Therefore, the optimal bidding strategy is to look at Firm B’s 
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offer and bid higher in relation to the expected range of offers. The bidders should 
estimate the first excluded bid, based on their perception of the range of opportunity 
costs, and bid just below the expected cut-off. If they are risk averse, they might shave 
their bid a bit to reduce the risk they face. After making the cash bid, the subject must 
incorporate the value of the NMIs offered. Bidders know their NMI value. In the bid 
method CRAM, bidders should deduct the true value of their NMIs from the cash bid; in 
the menu method CRAM, bidders should always take the cash only salary request and 
subtract the value of the selected NMIs. This adjusted cash value is the optimal bid in the 
menu method CRAM. 
E. EXPERIMENT LAYOUT AND DESIGN 
Now, that the auction mechanism process, CRAM, and experimental economics 
have been thoroughly reviewed, this area of the thesis will re-construct the actual 
experiment. The details of the layout and design of the Menu Method CRAM and Bid 
Method CRAM experiments conducted for this research are explained here. The 
experiments followed a consistent theoretical model of experimental economics based on 
previous research by Dr. Coughlan and Dr. Gates. The labor market experiment 
conducted for this thesis and on-going research complied with common, accepted quality 
control measures for labor market experiments. The outline of this section will follow a 
logical pattern based on the those measures of quaility. Davis and Holt originally 
classified the following procedural and design considerations for conducting labor market 
experiments in a laboratory (Norton, 2007). The concepts are Replicability, Control, 
Procedural Regularity, Motivation, Unbiasedness, Calibration, and Design Parellelism.  
1. Replicability and Control 
The primary advantage of conducting these experiments in this setting is that the 
laboratory environment offers the experimenters a degree of replicability and control. The 
experiment has been carefully designed by experienced experimenters and precisely 
documented, which allows for replication of the experiments conducted and independent 
examination of the results. Control is the capacity to manipulate the laboratory conditions 
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so that observed behavior can be used to evaluate alternative theories and policies (Holts 
& Davis, 1993). Unlike the natural markets, which have variations in the production and 
collection of data for evaluating alternative theories, in the laboratory setting the 
collection of distinguishing, relevant data is acheived due to the experimenters ability to 
set controls. In the experiments conducted for this research, control were established 
based on the experimenters and protors ability to control which questions are pertinent to 
the research, evaluation of possible inputs that may effect the data, strict control on 
access to data, and continual observance and control of subjects throughout the 
experiment.  
2. Procedural Regularity 
Procedural regularity focuses on the ability for the independent verification and 
the experiementer’s data collection methodology and ability to effectively report the 
results (Norton, 2007). In order to establish procedural regularity, this section will 
include the specific instructions given to the subjects, the make up or demographics of 
the subjects in the study, and the instructions given during the “trial” period or practice 
rounds, where no reward was given at that time. It is important that the experiment 
followed procedural norms, is created a laboratory setting that is replicable and 
controlled, and established professional credibility for further research and development 
in the field of auction mechanisms.  
The subjects were drawn from the student and staff population at the Naval 
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. A general email annoucement was 
produced and distributed, campus-wide to solicit volunteers for the experiment. An 
example of the message can be viewed in Figure 16. The message did not include 
specifics, or expose the exact details of the experiment, to avoid creating any 
preconceived notions, unrealistic expectations, or biased responses during the 
experiment. 
 
 Figure 16.   Request for Experimental Volunteers 
The computer generated experimental Menu Method CRAM and Bid Method 
CRAM tested a total of 50 subjects over a three day period, in a total of four sessions. 
The experiment was lead by Dr. Peter Coughlan and LT. Marlow Levy, Dr. William 
Gates, Dr. Noah Myung, and Capt. Kyle Hahn assisted as proctors. Each session 
consisted of 30 periods, or rounds, with specific and detailed instructions and adequate 
time for questions. The subjects were identified, confirmed, and assigned random 
computers throughout the lab as they entered the lab. Each subject, as they settled in their 
prospective seats began a simple on-line registration process.  
Additionally, they were instructed to sign a privacy and confidential statement 
before any other experimental procedures could proceed. Each participant signed and 
turned-in their original consent forms to a proctor or experimentor. An example of this 
form can be seen in the Appendix J. The initial instructions were provide and the scenario 
listed in Appendix A was introduced. New instructions with minor changes to the 
scenario were given after the 5th period, 10th period, 20th period, and 25th period. The 
average “Years of Service” (YOS) for the subjects was 11 years. There were 48 males 
and two female participants. The majority of the particpants in the study were active duty 
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Navy Officers, as seen in Figure 17, with 24 members represented. The individual YOS 




Figure 17.   Demographics of the Experimental Subjects 
One of the most important elements of the experiment is the instructions given to 
the subjects in the beginning of the experiment, as an introduction, and each subsequent 
set of instructions throughout the experiement. The instructions allowed the proctors and 
experimentors to lay out the details of the instruction, set the control conditions, set up 




clarify important details, address questions and concerns, and adjust for new 
experimental treatments throughout the process. The complete set of instructions for each 
round is included in Appendix A. Figure 18 is a sample of the registration form. 
 
 
Figure 18.   CRAM Experiment Registration Form 
Subjects were particiapting in a labor market research experiment and ask to make 
salary decisions based on the given scenario: 
3. Scenario Background  
You are one of 100 employees currently working for Firm A. Your only other 
potential employer is Firm B. You have no particular preference for Firm A or for Firm 
B. You can easily switch employers at no cost or inconvenience to you. Your only goal is 
to maximize the value of your annual compensation. 
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 Downsizing at Firm A 
 Firm A will be downsizing, and 50 of its 100 employees be will be 
laid off immediately.  
 After these one-time layoffs, however, employees will have the 
same level of job security at Firm A as at Firm B. 
 Employment Offer from Firm B 
 Firm B has offered to employ anybody who leaves Firm A. If you 
leave Firm A now, you will work at Firm B immediately. This 
standing offer of employment at Firm B applies whether you leave 
Firm A voluntarily or are laid off. 
 Salary Offer from Firm B  
 Firm B has presented a confidential annual salary offer to each 
employee currently working for Firm A. The offer presented to 
each employee represents the annual salary that he/she will receive 
if employed by Firm B. Firm B has offered different annual salary 
amounts to different Firm A employees. Firm B has offered to pay 
you the following annual salary: $ 172,000 
 Distribution of Salary Offers from Firm B 
 You do not know the salary amounts that Firm B has offered to 
other current employees at Firm A. You know only that all of Firm 
B's salary offers are spread evenly over some range. 
 In other words, these salary offers are spread evenly between some 
lower bound & some upper  bound. You do not know the actual 
lower and upper bounds of the range of salary offers. 
 However, you do know that the salary offered to you by Firm B 
lies somewhere within this range  of offers. Thus, it likely that 
some of Firm B's salary offers to potential employees are higher 
than your offer above. It is also likely that some of Firm B's salary 
offers to potential employees are lower than your offer. 
 Salary Survey at Firm A 
 The salary paid to any Firm A employee in previous years will 
have no influence on his/her future salary at Firm A. Instead, the 
annual salary that Firm A will pay to each of its retained 
employees will be determined using a survey. Firm A is asking 
each of its 100 workers to specify the minimum annual salary that 
he/she would need to receive in order to remain with Firm A. 
 Firm A will then retain the 50 of its 100 employees who submitted 
the 50 lowest salary requests. In other words, after collecting all 
100 “salary requests” from its employees, Firm A will lay off the 
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50 employees who submitted the 50 highest salary requests. Each 
of the 50 employees laid off will immediately begin working at 
Firm B at the salary previously offered. 
 The remaining 50 employees will work at Firm A. All employees 
retained by Firm A will be paid the same salary, regardless of the 
salary they requested. These retained employees will be paid the 
lowest salary that was requested among the 50 employees laid off. 
In other words, Firm A will pay all retained employees the 50th 
highest salary requested. Note that this salary will be as high or 
higher than the salary requested by any of the 50 retained 
employees. 
 Your Salary Request to Firm A 
 You must now decide what annual salary to request from Firm A. 
Remember that if your request is among the highest 50 of the 100 
salary requests submitted, you will be laid off from Firm A and 
will work for Firm B. If your salary request to Firm A is among the 
50 lowest requests, you will continue to work for Firm A and will 
receive an annual salary equal to the lowest salary requested 
among the 50 employees not retained. 
Table 7 served as a graphical representation of the written instructions provided to 
subjects. It further explained the scenario and the selection process, called a survey, 
utilize in Firm A’s decision process. Subjects were presented with multiple means of 
instruction to firmly establish they understand the instructions and clarify any 
misinformation or misinterpretation. Additionally, Figure 19 depicts the Practice Results 
sheet when a subject has completed their evaluation, submitted a bid, and Firm A has 
made its retention decisions. The subject was found to be one of the lowest bidders and 






















Table 7.   Sample of Salary Survey to Determine Employer and Salary (From: 
Coughlan, 2010) 
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 Figure 19.   Results for Menu Method CRAM Bid (Firm A) 
Figure 20 depicts the Practice Results sheet when a subject has completed their 
evaluation, submitted a bid, and Firm A has made its decision to lay off the employee. 
Therefore, the subject was one of the highest bidders and was separated to Firm B. 
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 Figure 20.   Results for Menu Method CRAM Bid (Firm B) 
4. Motivation 
The motivation or reward for particpiating in the experiment was clearly 
explained to the subjects in the experiment. Their “salary” upon completing the 
experiement was explained in the instructions. A depiction of the the pay-out form is 
included in this section to further illustrate the tools used in the experiment to motivate 
the subjects. Holts noted, “failing to use salient financial rewards is a critical error” 
(Holts & Davis, 1993). Figure 21 demonstrates the summary page with each subject’s 
results, experiemental earnings, and actual earnings. The subjects were paid in separate 
area to provide security and privacy. Each subject provided the experimentor with a 
signed copy of the summary as a pay-out record .  
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 Figure 21.   Example of Experiment Summary and Receipt Sheet 
5. Unbiasedness, Calibration and Design Parellelism 
The standard of calibration which states the experiment should set a baseline and 
the choices should be clearly delineated and understood (Holts & Davis, 1993). The 
calibration in the experiment is set from the beginning of each session in the instructions. 
Unbiasedness refers to an experiment that does not lead the subjects to perceive that any 
particular behavioral pattern as being expected or correct. The subjects in the experiment 
were givien few details about the actual experiment until they were in the lab under 
controlled conditions. Within the initial instructions they were advised that their decisions 
did not affect the other participants and they had no preference for a particular employer 
in the scenario. Therefore, subjects received no guidance on what to bid or had any 
motivation to compete with other subjects in the lab. Design Parellelism suggest that an 
experiment be constructed to resemble naturally occuring economic situations (Norton, 
2007). In this experiment, the scenario relates directly to a common occurrence at firm 
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throughout the country on a daily and personal basis. The data gathered from this 
experiment can be directly associated with naturally occurring economic phenomena, 
specifically retention in the U.S. Navy Nurse Corps.  
F.  CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The overall scenario in this research is that subjects are participating in a 
laboratory controlled experiment that mimics a real life labor market economic condition. 
The purpose, instructions and procedures are extremely important when designing and 
ultimately conducting labor market experiments. According to C. R. Plott, the 
instructions and procedures are of central importance to laboratory experimental methods 
(Plott, 2001). Not only are they important to the current experiment, they are important to 
all concurrent experiments on related topics, in addition to all future experiments (Plott, 
2001). Therefore, the purpose, instructions and procedures were the focus of Chapter IV. 
Appendix H. contains a section from Plott’s experimental design text on the importance 
proper instructions and layout when conducting labor market experiments.  
 72
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 73
V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A.  ANALYSIS 
The analysis gathered from the four experimental sessions revealed very little 
surprises when it come to the performance and efficiency of CRAM as a retention auction 
tool. However, there were some surprises as to the behavior of the participants and their 
performance when faced with complex decisions. As previously mentioned, there were 4 
sessions, over a 3-day period with 30 rounds or periods per session. On Day 1, the 
experimental Uniform and Discriminatory Menu Method CRAM was conducted during 2 
sessions. On Day 2, the experimental Discriminatory Bid Method CRAM was conducted 
on one session. Finally, on Day 3, the experimental Discriminatory Bid Method CRAM 
was conducted on one session. During the sessions themselves, the periods 1–5 and 26–
30 consist of Cash Only bids, periods 6–10 and 21–25 consist of Cash and NMI bids with 
additive effects, and periods 11–15 and 16–20 consist of the combinatorial discriminatory 
bids. The results reported here include the three discriminatory price rounds; these are 
combined with two sets of discriminatory price menu method CRAM experiments 
conducted by Captain Kyle Hahn for his Master’s thesis (being published concurrently) 
(Hahn, 2010). 
1. Cash-Only Salary Request Comparison Ratios 
Remember, in the uniform price auction, the bidder receives the salary of the first-
excluded offer. Therefore, everyone receives compensation with the same cost to the 
employer. The expected strategy is that subjects should bid their true value. Their bid 
does not affect the cost of their compensation package from Firm A, just whether they are 
retained. If subjects bid above their opportunity cost, they may be laid off and employed 
by Firm B, where the salary is already known and may be below the salary paid by Firm 
A. If they bid too low, they could be retained by Firm A, yet not receive a high enough 
salary to meet the foregone guaranteed salary offered by Firm B.  
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As described above, the bidding strategy is more complicated for discriminatory 
price auctions, such as those reported here. Subjects should estimate the first excluded 
bid and bid just below that amount. Assuming the opportunity costs (Firm B offers) for 
the other bidders are probabilistic and uniformly distributed over some range, the 
equilibrium bidding strategy in a discriminatory price auction is to assume you are the 
medium value amongst the least cost participants (those that would be retained if bids 
were truthful). With Firm A retaining 50% of its employees, if subjects knew the upper 
bound of the Firm B offers, they should bid a Cash Only price to Firm A that is one third 
of the difference between their value and the upper bound Firm B offer. This is the 
“optimal” cash bid reported here for the discriminatory price auction. 
Only the discriminatory price auctions are discussed here, so one would expect 
participants to bid above their opportunity cost and closer to the optimal bid described 
above. The Cash Only bid participants submitted in both the discriminatory Menu and 
Bid Method CRAM sessions was very close to the optimal cash bid, the average request 
across all rounds was exactly 100% of the optimal bid (one third of the difference 
between the bidders opportunity cost and the upper-bound Firm B offer), with a 
standard deviation of .22. It simply means on average the subjects were bidding at their 
optimal value or close to it, when it comes to the Cash Only salary request surveys. The 
results of the experiment show subjects were bidding 5% above their optimal value in 
rounds 1–5. However, in the later “Cash Only” bid rounds of 26–30, they were much 
closer to the optimal value; they requested 98% of the optimal valued bid request. It 
indicates that subjects were increasing their ability to interpret their opportunity cost and 
bid appropriately. Rather than continuing to bid too high, and increase their bidder 
surplus but risk being separated, they return to some value equilibrium point, close to 
their optimal bid. It was similar in all other rounds also, subject seem to adjust their 
bidding strategy for the cash only bids in the later rounds, to move closer to the optimal 
salary request. When looking at the Cash plus NMI’s with additive effects, periods 6–10 
and 21–25, the subjects maintain a 2% average below and above the optimal salary 
request, respectively. The subjects in combinatorial discriminatory periods (rounds 11–15 
and 16–20) were relatively consistent in all those periods at 98% of the optimal bid. For 
reference, Figure 22 also shows the relationship between the actual cash bid and the 
bidders’ opportunity cost. As expected with optimal discriminatory bids, the actual bids 
exceed opportunity cost by approximately 15 percent. 
 
 
Figure 22.   Discriminatory Cash Bids Optimal Request vs. Opportunity Cost 
In Figure 23, we see the Post NMI salary request vs. the optimal value and 
opportunity cost. In the Menu Method CRAM, bidders select their NMI package and 
submit a cash salary request understanding that the cost of the NMIs selected will be 
added to their salary request to determine their cost to retain; if retained, they will receive 
all NMIs selected. In the Menu Method CRAM, bidders should reduce their cash only 
optimal salry bid by the cost of any NMI selected. Figure 25 shows the Cash Only salary 
requests both with and without NMIs. Rounds 1–5 and 26–30, so these values represent 
purely cash salary requests. Figure 23 shows that these requests are about 5% above 
optimal in rounds 1–5 and slightly below the optimal in rounds 26–30. The data further 
show that bidders seem to have reduced their salary requests more than optimal in the 
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first five rounds with additive NMI values (rounds 6–10) and with combinatorial NMI 
values (rounds 11–15); the cash salary request moves closer to the optimal level in the 
later combinatorial and additive NMI rounds (rounds 16–20 and 21–25). After allocation 
of the NMI’s, the results of the surveys did not change for the Menu Method CRAM or 
Bid Method CRAM. The average remained at 100%, and all rounds were identical to the 
value maximizing percentage seen with the Cash Only bids. In all rounds, subjects were 
continuing to bid the optimal value and reservation wage. 
 
 
Figure 23.   Menu Method Post NMI Request Optimal Bid vs. Opportunity Cost 
2. NMI Bids True Value vs. Optimal Value 
When including NMIs in the discriminatory price auction, the equilibrium bidding 
strategy in the CRAM menu method can be characterized as selecting any NMI for which 
your value exceeds your cost and adjusting your cash request by the NMI costs. In the 
CRAM bid method, your cash bid cannot anticipate that you will be granted any NMIs 
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because you do not know if the NMI value you bid is greater than cost. Therefore, you 
want to understate your true NMI value in a discriminatory price auction; the more you 
understate your value the greater your surplus if you receive the NMI, but the lower the 
probability of receiving the NMI. The equilibrium strategy is to bid five-eighths (62.5%) 
of your NMI value for individual NMIs or additive combinations. There is a similar, but 
more complicated relationship for NMI packages with combinatorial values. These NMI 
bidding strategies for the Menu Method and Bid Method CRAM will be referred to as the 
“optimal” bidding strategies in this discussion. 
Figure 24 shows that on average subjects bid 76.8% of their true NMI value for 
NMI 1 bid, and 73.7% of value when they bid for NMI 2. When comparing the “Cash 
plus NMI with additive effect” rounds of 6–10 and 21–25, we note a slight increase in the 
bids for NMI1 and NMI2; their bid for NM1 was 78.9% and NMI2 80.7% of their 
reservation wage. There is a slight decrease as the subjects bid in the Combinatorial 
Discriminatory rounds, from 11–15 to 16–20. In rounds 11–15, subjects bid below their 
value for NMI1 at 74.7% and NMI2 at 69.4 percent. In rounds 16–20, they bid at 72.9% 
of their value for NMI1 and 67.7% for NMI2. Thus, participants consistently under bid 
their NMI values, introducing the possibility that they would leave “money on the table” 
by not receiving NMIs for which their value exceeded the cost. These bids were higher 
than the equilibrium, full-information strategy, which could reflect risk-aversion 
(increasing bids to increase the probability of receiving the NMI but reducing the profit if 
awarded) or some other factor. 
 Figure 24.   Comparing Non-Monetary Incentive True Values 
In the discriminatory Bid Method CRAM, the subject consistently bid above their 
optimal value. As noted in Figure 25, if the optimal bid is 100%, subjects bid 46% above 
the optimal bid in all Bid Method CRAM rounds. In the Cash plus NMIs with additive 
effect rounds, we see a slight increase in their bidding pattern. Subjects were bidding 
26.2% above the optimal value for NMI1 and 24.4% above, in rounds 6–10. The pattern 
continues in the later rounds 21–25. The subjects bid 29.1% above their optimal value for 
NMI1 in rounds 21–25, and 27.8% above their value for NMI2 of the same round. In the 
combinatorial discriminatory rounds 11–15 and 16–20, subjects also bid above their 
optimal value. In rounds 11–15, subjects bid 59.4% above their value for NMI 1 and 48% 
for NMI2. In addittion, subjects bid 55.6% and 44.4% above their optimal value for 
NMI1 and NMI2, respectively. 
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 Figure 25.   Comparing Non-Monetary Incentive Optimal Value 
3. NMI Allocation Efficiency 
The experiments yielded some interesting results related to efficiency of NMI 
allocation. This addresses whether the subjects selected the NMIs that maximized their 
value over cost. If efficient allocation is the base line at one, meaning one indicates an 
efficient NMI allocation, then any value less than one indicates the fraction of 
participants selecting the efficient combination of NMIs. If every participant receives the 
efficient NMI allocation, the associated “Dead Weight Loss” should be equal to 0; where 
dead weight loss is the surplus value lost by an inefficient NMI allocation; dead weight 
loss greater than zero indicates the relative magnitude the efficiency loss. 
The results in Figure 26 show that 55% of the participants select the efficient 
NMIs over all rounds involving NMIs. The percentages of efficient selections are higher 
in the rounds involving additive NMI values (6–10 and 21–25) as opposed to the 
combinatorial NMI value rounds (11–15 and 16–20). The data also shows a strong  
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learning effect, with the percentage of efficient NMI allocations increasing from the early 
additive and combinatorial rounds to the later rounds. The average deadweight loss per 
participant shows similar patterns, as reflected in Figure 27.  
 
 
Figure 26.   Percent Efficient NMI Allocation 
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 Figure 27.   Dead Weight Loss per Participant 
Additionally, we see in both methods that although there were improvements in 
efficiency allocation in the Cash plus Combinatorial bids, periods 11–15 and 16–20, the 
efficiency itself was just above 50%, initially. They improved by 6%, the results showed 
the level at 52% in periods 11–15 and 58% in periods 16–20. The Cash Only rounds of 
periods 1–5 and 26–30 were not included because there were no NMI’s in the rounds. 
Bidder surplus is the value the subjects gained above their opportunity cost. The 
average bidder surplus foregone denotes the surplus value the average subject scould 
have received if they placed the optimal cash and NMI value bids. Bidder surplus 
foregone can be envisioned as “the money left on the table;” the total potential surplus 
value with the optimal bids minus the realized surplus value. Figure 28 shows that 
bidders or subjects began losing less of their surplus value in the later periods of the 
Additive NMI value (rounds 6–10 and 21–25), which is consistant with subjects learning 
with experience. However, bidders actually lost more of their surplus value in the later 
combinatorial value NMI rounds (rounds 11–15 and 16–20). As mentioned previously, 
the combinatorial rounds may have been more complex for the subjects to understand. 
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 Figure 28.   Average Bidder Surplus Foregone 
 
Figure 29.   Actual vs. Optimal Total Cost Request 
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4. The Cost of Retention 
The following results report the value and cost comparison to the retainee for the 
incentives they selected and Firm A’s cost to retain the individuals. Also, reported are the 
value percentages and cost of only those individuals retain by Firm A in the scenario. The 
value for the bidders retained by Firm A and Firm A’s cost to retain them is displayed in 
Figure 30. The overall average value in dollar amounts, attained by the bidder was 
$106,278. The overall cost to the firm was $103,674. However, results by round are more 
instructive. Notice value and cost are identical for the cash only retention rounds (1–5 
and 26–30); when cash is the only incentive value and cost are necessarily the same. 
Value exceed cost in the NMI rounds, with ther difference growing slightly in the final 
NMI rounds as the participants learn the optimal bidding strategy.  
These results demonstrate that Menu Method CRAM and Bid Method CRAM 
perform efficiency by providing the individual with incentives whose value to the 
retainees exceeds the firm’s cost to retain. The differences indicated here here reflect just 
two NMIs and NMI values that are relatviely low relative to the opportunity cost at Firm 
B. In actuality, the differences are likely to be substantially greater as more NMIs are 
offered and some NMIs have significantlly higher values for at least some bidders..  
Figure 31 demonstrates that on average, subjects received 95% of their optimal 
value in the CRAM process over all rounds; only 5% of their optimal value was foregone. 
For a complex discriminatory price auction with additive and combinatorial NMI values, 
this is a rather remakable outcome. Furthermore, the percent of optimal value captured 
clearly increases with experience in the auction. The complexity of discriminatory price 
price auctions, as well as complexity of the additive and combinatorial value NMIs, play 
a role in this lapse, causing bidders not optimizes there values consistantly. Clearly, 
additional instruction and experience would improve general bidder perfomance. 
 Figure 30.   The Value and Cost of Retention 
 
Figure 31.   All Bidder Actual Value vs. Optimal Value 
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Figure 32 shows the relative actual and optimal value versus the cost of those 
retained by Firm A. This performance is slightly lower than for all bidders, as depicted 
above, because actual and optimal value is essentially the same for the employees 
separated to Firm B, unless they are inefficiently separated. Figure 32 focuses specifically 
on those participants whose pay was determined by the bids submitted because they were 
retained by Firm A. Again, this performance is remarkably good, with bidder values and 
firm costs registering over 92% of the optimal value across all rounds. Again, the data 
shows noticibale learning as the subjects more trhough the rounds (the second iterations 
of each auction alternative have substantially better results than the first iteration). 
Furthemore, the data shows that the bidders perform better in the cash only rouinds than 
with the additive NI values; perfomrance is the lowest in the combinatorial NMI value 
rounds. This mirrors the issues with complexity described above.  
 
 
Figure 32.   The Relative Value to Cost Comparisons  
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5. Errors in the Experiment 
The experiment did reveal inefficiencies. Errors were noted in both CRAM 
methods related to the retention and separation of some bidders. The final analysis found 
some bidders were retained by Firm A, but would have been better off at Firm B. We 
called this phenomena “inefficient retention” (e.g., a bidder submits an $80,000 salary 
request and is retained by Firm A, but could have earned $100,000 from Firm B). There 
were 143 bids (~7% of all bids) where a bidder had a reservation wage above the salary 
they received from Firm A, and was inefficiently retained by Firm A (for a total value 
less than their opportunity cost at Firm B). In addition, there were “inefficient 
separations” noted in the overall results; bidders with opportunity costs or reservation 
wages below the cutoff for Firm A, but bid above the cutoff and were separated (e.g., a 
bidder submits an $120,000 salary request to Firm A and is separated because the Firm A 
cut off is $100,000; however, their Firm B salary is $80,000, so they should have been 
retained by Firm A for a salary below $100,000). A total of 164 bidders (~8% of all 
bidders) were separated from Firm A that would have been better off if retained. Finally, 
84 bidders (~4% of all bids) were retained by Firm A and should have been retained by 
Firm A if they bid optimally, but given the sub-optimal bids they actually submitted, they 
would have preferred to have been retained by Firm B (e.g., a bidder submits an $80,000 
salary request and is retained by Firm A, but could have earned $100,000 from Firm B, at 
the same time, the Firm A cutoff is $120,000; given their bid, this subject would prefer to 
be retained by Firm B, if they bid optimally they should have been retained by Firm A).  
6. Summary 
The labor market experiments conducted for this thesis produced results that were 
consistent with previous research related to CRAM. The final experiments were limited 
to Discriminatory Bid Method CRAM based logistical miscalculations. However, enough 
data points were acquired in the research and experiments, to compare the basic tenants 
of discriminatory price bidding under the Menu Method CRAM and the Bid Method. The 
results revealed a consistent pattern of learning by the bidders in the experiment and 
maximization of value > cost. The Cash Only salary requests were routinely close to their 
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optimal values. However, value to cost maximization was significantly lower when NMIs 
were incorporated into the compensation package, particularly for the combinatorial 
values rounds, 11–15 and 16–20. It appears that bidders had difficulty bidding their 
optimal NMI prices in both CRAM methods. There appears to be a correlation to this 
decline in value maximization and the complexity of the combinatorial rounds.  
B.  CONCLUSIONS 
As the Navy Nurse Corps continues to seek new and innovative retention tools 
that can also provide a cost savings, CRAM with cash incentives must be at the top of 
their list. Cash bids in the discriminatory price auction are close to optimal; NMI bids are 
also reasonably efficient when values are additive. Bidders may require additional 
instruction when NMI values are combinatorial. The mechanism gives the service 
member the incentives they most value and saves the Navy a substantial amount of 
money in the short and long run. Although the experimental population is not made up of 
Navy nurses, the experiments are applicable to any community. The NMIs in the 
experiment were generically identified as NMI 1 and 2, so the results should be general 
across Navy communities. The Menu Method CRAM and Bid Method CRAM will allow 
junior and prior-enlisted Nurse Corps to bid on the NMIs they value most, such as 
homesteading, sabbaticals, assignment choices, childcare, etc. and save the NNC possibly 
millions of dollars in the process.  
1. The Primary Reasons for the Study 
The experiment answers the primary question for this thesis in detail. The 
independent and interdependent effects of monetary and non-monetary incentives 
utilizing a discriminatory price auction were identified in the experiments. They clearly 
demonstrate a positive learning pattern throughout the four sessions, and within each 
group of sessions. Subjects learned as they progressed in the experiment, as evidenced by 
their ability to bid closer to their optimal value in the Discriminatory Menu Method and 
Bid Method CRAM experiments. The Cash Only and Cash plus NMI’s with additive 
effects were the most effective at getting to an efficient solution. The effectiveness of the 
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participant’s bidding strategies improved as they progressed in each session. The results 
of the Cash Only salary request comparison would suggests that if the Navy Nurse Corps 
were using a Cash Only salary auction, the target group of nurses would bid close to their 
optimal price, which would be above cost. The bottom line of these results is a huge cost-
savings mechanism for the Navy Nurse Corps, and a value driven gain for those nurses 
retained. Numerous studies report similar results to this experiment. 
The secondary research question addressed specific issues in the NNC community 
related to value for NNC officers, decision-making behavior of NNC officers, retention 
of specific groups within the NNC community, and possible cost effectiveness of a 
program, such as CRAM.  
2. Secondary Questions 
The secondary research questions look to examine specific issues in the NNC 
community related to value for NNC officers, decision-making behavior of NNC officers, 
retention of specific groups within the NNC community, and possible cost effectiveness 
of a program, such as CRAM. According to a CNA study used for this thesis, junior and 
prior enlisted NNC officers highly value many of the same incentives as SWOs in Brown 
and Burr’s research (Browning & Burr, 2009). NMIs, such as homesteading, assignment 
of choice, sabbaticals, and more control over career choices, seem to be highly valued 
among nurses (Whitmore, Hill, & Bickett, 2009). Many secondary questions will be 
answered in future labor market experiments conducted specifically for NNC officers. 
However, we can acquire many beneficial observations from this experiment.  
The research indicates that subjects increased their ability to judge their value and 
bid accordingly as their experience in the auction increased. Rather than continue to bid 
too high and increase their bidder surplus, or bid too low and sacrifice profits to increase 
their probability of retention, they returned to some value equilibrium point, closer to 
their optimal bid. It was similar in all other rounds/periods also. Subjects seem to adjust 
their bidding strategy for the Cash Only bids in the later rounds, as they get closer to the 
optimal salary request. This would suggest that discriminatory Menu Method CRAM and  
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Bid Method CRAM could both be an effective retention tool for the NNC. The two 
CRAM methods would also allow NNC leaders to create the optimal mix of monetary 
and non-monetary incentives for junior and prior-enlisted officers. 
C.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results and findings in this thesis are neither conclusive nor complete. There 
are numerous areas that should be explored and tested before CRAM can be fully 
operational in the NNC. However, there is some value the Department of the Navy, 
Bureau of Navy Medicine, and the NNC community can gain from tools, such as CRAM. 
The Department of the Navy should increase funding for research at NPS related to the 
development of CRAM and its implementation. Based on the results of the research, the 
Bureau of Navy Medicine should examine utilizing some form of Menu Method or Bid 
Method CRAM in other communities where retention goals are consistently not met.  
The NNC should begin continuous funding and support of research related to 
Menu Method and Bid Method CRAM. In the long run, the cost saving from these 
auction mechanisms would offset any initial investment. Based on the generational 
differences in the NNC, junior nurses and prior enlisted may desire different NMIs or 
cash as a retention incentive. CRAM allows the officers to select incentive packages that 
address their individual needs, while maximizing their value, and improving quality of 
life. Once a year, one or two NNC officers attend the Naval Postgraduate School, 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy. The nurses could be assigned to the 
CRAM research team, furthering the research for the use CRAM methods in Nurse 
Corps, and conducting experiments related to Nurse Corps officers incentive programs.  
Additionally, the NNC can begin implementing small, inexpensive NMI programs 
and conducting internal cost analysis to further develop a program, such as Menu Method 
or Bid Method CRAM. Homesteading or more control of one’s career are NMIs that 
could be implement at small, local and regional commands with little direct cost to the 
NNC. The programs can be carefully monitored and slowly progress to the larger 
commands as CRAM development and usage matures. Senior leaders in the NNC are 
very concerned and focused on retention issues related to junior officers and prior 
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enlisted nurses. The Menu Method and Bid Method CRAM should be their primary tools 
for selecting monetary and non-monetary incentives for retention of junior and prior 
enlisted NNC officers. The CRAM methods can become the basis for implementing their 
retention plans and policies, measuring effectiveness of their programs, and retaining 
higher quality skilled nurses. 
D.  FURTHER RESEARCH  
The limits of this research directly correspond to the scarcity of time and 
resources. Yet, it does allow many other avenues to explore in future researchers 
interested in auction mechanisms. The expansion of the research is inevitable; therefore, 
future research will build upon this thesis and many others. Recommendations for future 
research include:  
 Data gathered to date should be disaggregated between Bid Method and 
Menu Method CRAM to further distinguish between the performance of 
these two mechanisms. 
 Researchers should perform future experiments on specific, targeted 
officer communities, such as the NNC.  
 Conduct research and analysis on the cost of providing different NMIs to 
NNC officers or other communities and inputting them into a CRAM 
labor market experiment. 
 Conduct labor market research using partial and full-information CRAM. 
 Perform a cost benefit analysis for NNC value vs. cost for cash bonuses 
and NMIs.  
 Research should continue developing CRAM software and product design 
The Navy Nurse Corps continues to prove it is an innovative leader in delivering 
healthcare to the Navy population they serve. Navy Medicine cannot function without the 
fuel that feeds its manpower system, the nurses serving in the NNC. Therefore, retention 
is a priority for continuing operational and humanitarian success. Recognizing and 
addressing retention at this time, while retention is relatively high, is a priority. Junior 
nurses are leaving the active duty NNC at an alarming rate for a number of personal 
reasons described in this thesis. Prior enlisted officers are retiring at a higher rate because 
they have nothing left to serve for in the NNC. The CRAM, auction mechanism in the 
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NNC can be the next innovation that redefines retention incentives in the U.S. Navy. As 
usual, the Navy Nurse Corps should be the organization that takes the lead and blazes the 
trail on retention mechanisms in military medicine. 
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